

4. As he has discussed the points in the traditional way  
thank Mr. H. K. Vedavyasachar.

*Asthanavidwan Vedanta Vidwan*  
Mysore. Madhure V. SREENIVASACHARYA

5. I got read the book completely and I came to know  
that the book is faithful to the principles of Sri Madhva's  
Philosophy.

*Mahamahopadhaya,*  
V. SHAMACHARYA  
*Idan.*

ram,

Sitapathi Agrahar,  
Bangalore City.

3. THE SECRETARY,  
Sri Sarvagnacharya Seva Sangha,  
Davanagere.

॥ श्रीः ॥

# SRI MADHVA'S TATTVA-VADA

A critique of Mr. H. N. R's

MADHVA'S CONCEPTION OF SVATANTRA

BY

H. K. VEDAVYASACHAR

(with a foreword by Prof. D. Vasudevacharya  
S.M.S. College, Mysore, and an introduction  
by Mr. H. Subba Rao, M.A.,  
Mysore University, Mysore)

'INSULT NOT TRUTH FOR FEAR  
OF MAN'—TAGORE

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॥ श्रीमत्परिमल्लाचार्योविजयतेतराम् ॥

TO

THE BELOVED MEMORY

OF

MY FATHER AND GURU

HIS HOLINESS

SRIMAT SUVRATINDRATIRTHA SRIPADAH



वेदान्ते न विभु न वेदनिपुणः सत्तर्कवाचस्पतिः

शाब्दे नास्ति परिश्रमो नच कविः साहित्यविद्यानिधिः ।

एवं सत्यपि राघवेन्द्रसुयतेः कारुण्यतोऽलंकृतः

ग्रन्थोऽयं गुरुसुव्रतीन्द्रयमिनां मोदाय भूयादलम् ॥







॥ श्रीपरिमलग्रन्थप्रकाशनमन्दिरम् ॥

## विज्ञापनम्

श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थीय सच्छास्त्रामृतवर्षकः ।

श्रीमत्परिमलो नाम भाति प्रकटनालयः ॥

विदितचरमेवेदं यत् श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यवर्यत्वा-  
द्यमन्दबिरुदबृन्दभूषितैः चतुःषष्टिकलापारावारपारीणैः श्रीमद्द्वैत-  
सिद्धान्तप्रतिष्ठापनाचार्यधुरन्धरैः षड्दर्शनाचार्यवर्य विद्याचक्रवर्ति  
दिग्विजय विद्यासिंहासनाधीश्वर जगद्गुरु श्रीमद्विजयीन्द्रतीर्थश्रीम-  
च्चरणैः चतुरध्वेकशतप्रबन्धाः, श्रीमत्कविसार्वभौम श्रीमत्सुधीन्द्रतीर्थ-  
पूज्यचरणप्रभृतिभिः बहवो ग्रन्थाश्च प्रणीता इति । एवं सत्स्वपि  
बहुप्रबन्धेषु अवश्यप्रकाशनीयेषु नैतावतासामस्त्येन प्रकाशिता इति  
महदिदं विषादस्थानम् । श्रीमद्द्वैतसिद्धान्तस्य स्तम्भस्थानीयानामे-  
तेषां ग्रन्थानां अप्रकाशनसम्भूतं महान्तं लोपं परिजिहीर्षुभिरस्माभि-  
रेतद्ग्रन्थप्रकाशनमन्दिरमवतारितम् ॥ सम्प्रति विमलप्रशान्ततेजोविरा-  
जमानमध्वसिद्धान्तकासारे विद्वान्. श्री. एच्. एन्. राघवेन्द्राचार्य-  
महोदयाः “ मध्वाचार्याणां स्वतन्त्रब्रह्मवादा ” ख्य (Madhva's Con-  
ception of Svatanttra) ग्रन्थरूपं महान्तं पाषाणं प्राक्षिपन् । तज्जनि-  
तास्फोटनेन प्रभुञ्च सरस्सलिलम् । अन्ततस्तत्त्वजिज्ञासवः केचित्  
तत्त्वसंशीतिग्रहप्रस्ता, अपरेतु तत्रैवास्थां प्रदर्शयन्तः विपरीतज्ञानि-  
नोऽपि दरीदृश्यन्ते ॥ दशमिमामालोक्य दूयमानमानसैरेतत्प्रकटनाल-  
यसदस्यैः प्रेरितः श्री. एच्. के. वेदव्यासाचार्यमहाशयः “ श्रीमन्म-  
ध्वाचार्याणां तत्त्ववादः ” (Sri Madhva's Tattva-Vada) इति ग्रन्थम-

रीरचत् । प्रबन्धोऽयं श्रीराघवेन्द्राचार्यकृत “ स्वतन्त्रवादे ” (Madhva's conception of Svatantra) आविष्कृतानपसिद्धान्तान् सयुक्तिकं विचार्य संशोधयति । आविष्करोतिच साम्प्रदायिकं सिद्धान्तरहस्यं सप्रमाणम् ॥

अतः सत्तत्वाविष्करणोत्सुकैरस्माभिरयमेवग्रन्थः सद्यः प्राकाशि । आशास्महे चैतद्ग्रन्थावलोकनेन तत्त्वजिज्ञासवः कृतार्था भवेयुः, सार्थकीकुर्युश्च प्रणेतृप्रयासमिति ॥ अपरं चेदं सामोदमावेदयामः यदस्मादेव सदसः श्रीमद्विजयीन्द्रतीर्थ पूज्यचरणविरचितं भेदविद्याविलासाख्यं प्रबन्धरत्नं मुद्रणायसज्जीकृतं अचिरादेव प्रकाशपथमधिरोहतीति ॥ इति सुधीजनवशंवदः,

राजा. एस्. गुरुराजाचार्यः.

नञ्जलगूड मुक्कोटिद्वादशी  
स्वभानुसंवत्सरः



K. SREENIVASACHARYA,  
*Nyaya Sahitya Vedanta Vignawan, Nyaya Siromani.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page		Page
1 Introduction	... 1	5 Chapter IV	... 63
2 Chapter I	... 17	6 Chapter V	... 62
3 Chapter II	... 26	7 Conclusion	... 73
4 Chapter III	... 35		

## FOREWORD

It is with great pleasure that I respond to the request of Sri Raja Gururajacharya, Kavatilaka, President of the Sri Parimala publishing House, Nanjangud to write a foreword to this Philosophical work. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's Monism of Dvaita is the darkness of night; the Parimala Publishing House with its handsome and magnanimous-minded President may be likened to the eastern horizon itself with the bright morning sun radiating the light of Sri Madhva's Tattva-Vada.

The Monism of Sri Madhva is a purely heretical notion which has assumed the proportion of exciting a keen controversy not because it has anything in the Sastras to support it, but because its propounder Mr. H. N. R. bears a Vidwat-diploma and the book he has written is published by the Mysore University. Pouranikaratnam Holavanahalli Seshacharya, who is the *guru* of Mr. H. N. R. supports it somehow. Rajasevasakta Prof. A. R. Wadia who was the teacher of Mr. H. N. R. in the College has written a foreword to his book, "The Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedanta" stating that 'Mr. H. N. R. has argued with cogency how in essence Madhvacharya is a monist though the exigencies of nomenclature led him to call his philosophy Dvaitism to distinguish it from the monism of Sankara and Ramanuja alike.' Obviously, the Professor believed that Mr. H. N. R.'s conceptions of derived reality of the world, sole reality in Dvaita, of God as the creator of all and giver of reality to all, source of reality to even eternal things and svarupa srshti of eternal entities etc., were faithful to the Sastras. The confusion was worse confounded by reports that the work of Mr. H. N. R. was approved by heads of Madhva Mutts. When I sought permission of the University to publish a criticism of Mr. H. N. R.'s book, I received a reply No. 4836, of 10th June 1942 which while granting me permission, stated that Mr. H. N. R.'s book was approved by eminent heads of certain Madhva Mutts and the writer had had an excellent reception in Madras and in other places on account of his work.



After the publication of my book "Dvaita Pradipa and Tattva Sikshe," Sri Seshacharya also wrote to news papers that the present Swamiji of Sri Raghavendraswamin Mutt had written to him in a letter dated 16—6—1943 that his Holiness had not approved my book of criticism. All these factors have heated the matter of controversy to the melting point and the result of it is no doubt obvious to thinking minds. The dross of monism in Dvaita will be burnt up and the pure gold of Dvaita will shine bright as ever, like burnished gold.

The only truth about the several reports mentioned above is that Mr. H. N. R.'s work has met with downright condemnation from every quarter except from the Advaita Maha Mandal who were so pleased by seeing Sri Madhva proselytised into an Advaitin on the pages of Mr. H. N. R.'s book that they even conferred a title upon him, subject to the sanction of their elders; Rao Bahadur, K. S. Ramaswamy Sastry B.A., B.L., Retired Sub-Judge who presided at a lecture delivered by Mr. H. N. R. in Madras also spoke approvingly when he heard that Dvaita was an Ekatattva-vada, a form of *Advaita*. A few people who have no thorough knowledge of Dvaita may also support Mr. H. N. R. No head of any eminent Madhva Mutt has approved the book; nor has any reception been given to Mr. H. N. R. in connection with this book. Indeed the author even received a too hot reception at Bangalore, Sri Madhva Sangha, last year when he gave expression to some of his queer views. With regard to my book of criticism the Swamiji was not asked for opinion, nor could he express his opinion as my book was not even written in full on 16—6—1943. If the entire letter referred to by Sri Seshacharya is published, the public will know how damaging it is to the position of Sri Seshacharya himself. But of that confidential matter nothing need be said here. Suffice it to say that neither the Swamiji of Sri Raghavendraswamin Mutt nor the head of any other Madhva Mutt can possibly approve such illogical views as those of Mr. H. N. R. and countenance the act of alleging irrational doctrines to Sri Madhva, the reputed Sarvagnacharya.

A curious inability—almost inexplicable—to distinguish between the poorvapaksha interpretations of Srutis and the Siddhanta interpretations of them by Sri Madhva and secondly between the poorvapaksha positions to Sri Madhva and his Siddhanta positions and thirdly a totally odd conception of definitions of Monism and Pluralism, etc., have been the basis of this startling novelty of Sri Madhva's monism presented by Mr. H. N. R. in the article under review. But Sri Madhva has not called himself an Advaitin anywhere, nor has any scholar of Sri Madhva so far called his system monism. Mr. H. N. R. has represented Sri Madhva as a monist and states that it is Sri Madhva's own view, not his (Mr. H. N. R.'s) own view of Sri Madhva. If he had stated that, in his opinion, Sri Madhva's philosophy descends to monism considering certain features of thought, the gravity of the controversy would have changed altogether. But now, it is a charge of *misrepresentation* that Mr. H. N. R. has to clear himself from. Secondly, Dvaita Philosophy is still a living philosophy, and is studied minutely by numerous persons. Any changed interpretation of such a popular system is sure to be disputed unless proper causes can be shown in justification of such a changed exposition. I have taught the philosophy to many students these fifteen years; and not one has given me the surprise of a monistic presentation of Dvaita in his answer book at any time. It is impossible to read monism into Dvaita literature. The test of a biography is its faithfulness to the life portrayed. So too a work of philosophy must first faithfully expound the doctrine of the philosopher in question and then critically consider those views in the light of recognised standards of modern philosophic thought by using words in harmony with tradition and authoritative usage. This book by Ch. Vedavyasachar invites Mr. H. N. R. to fulfil his obligations to Dvaita philosophy first in the interests of Truth and next in the interests of numerous scholars who have felt his exposition a sacrilege to their sacred system.

The writer of the introduction to this book is a well-known scholar in Dvaita. His scholarship is the result of a minute comparative study of several systems of thought, Eastern and Western ; and its excellence is acknowledged by no less an authority than the late lamented Sri Satya Dhyana Thirtha Sri Swamiji, the pontiff of Sri Uttaradi Mutt who was revered as the very incarnation of Sri Madhva's teachings. Mr. H. Subba Rao is an unquestionable recognised authority on the tersest problems in Dvaita philosophy and his works on behalf of the late Sri Satya Dhyana Thirtha Sri Swamiji are an evidence of philosophical acumen of the highest order. The publication of Mr. Subba Rao's "Is Sri Madhva a Monist?" will be the fulfilment of the promise made in this book.

*Chiranjivi* H. K. Vedavyasachar is the son of Sri Vidwan Krishnacharya (of Chitaldurg) who became the late pontiff of Sri Raghavendra Swamin Mutt. He began his studies in philosophy under his uncle and has developed his knowledge remarkably in recent years. In this book, he has exposed Mr. H. N. R's position with perfect clearness and has argued with unimpeachable cogency of argument and unchallengeable support of the Sastras how in essence Sri Madhva is the maintainer of a particular form of uncompromising dualism, (the dualism of Svatantra-Paratantra) besides pointing out the fallacies of reasoning in Mr. H. N. R's article. The book is written, says *Ch. Vedavyasachar*, in order to set young minds in the right path of acquiring knowledge of Dvaita, and to convert Mr. H. N. R. himself. I wish him success in his enterprise and recommend the book to unstinting encouragement on the part of the public and the University.

Sri Raghavendra Prasad, }  
 MYSORE, }  
 9th December 1943. }

D. VASUDEVACHARYA.

## PREFACE

Two years ago, when a discussion arose in Sri Mantralaya respecting the faithfulness of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's work: 'The Dvaita Philosophy and its place in the Vedanta,' I began to search the Dvaita philosophy in the originals for any support in them to a monistic presentation of the teachings of Sri Madhva. And now two months ago, in course of a discussion with my friend, Mr. K. V. Rao, Medical Practitioner, Nanjangud, the idea of writing a critical pamphlet on Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's article, (Sri Madhva's conception of Svatantra p. 1-36 Mysore University Journal Vol. IV 1943 November) entered my mind. The voice of my Professor dictated the manner of my work, the method of presenting ideas and the expression to be used. I am therefore grateful to my beloved teacher, Professor C. R. Narasimha Sastri M.A., for his advice "to keep the controversy clear of all personalities and conduct it in the spirit of poet Tagore's message to the Maharaja's College. "Insult not Truth for fear of Man." I must thank my friend Mr. K. V. Rao himself for lending me his copy of the article for use and prompting me to write this by his stimulating questionnaire. My learned brother Vidwan K. Srinivasacharya, Siromani has furnished me with copious references (which could not be exhausted in this little volume) and has blessed me with explanations of many passages. My respected teacher Mr. H. Subba Rao has guided me throughout the preparation of this book with innumerable suggestions and corrections, besides adorning the book with the Introduction. I may call this a Primer of Dvaita philosophy based on a repeated study of his manuscript work: "Is Sri Madhva a Monist? or the Necessity of Pluralism." Panditaratnam Nerur Krishnacharya, Nyayabhushana Mahavidwan D. Krishnamurthyacharya, Mahavidwan Vidwanmani D. Vasudevacharya have helped me with profound and illuminating suggestions. To Professor D. Vasudevacharya in particular, I am indebted also for the foreword to this book. I thank my uncle and Guru Vidvadbhushana Bhimacharya for explaining certain Candrika and Sudha passages.

Next, I thank Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar himself for having inaugurated a new line of debate respecting the fundamentals of Dvaita by presenting the Antaryamitva-vada (the doctrine of immanence) as Advaita-vada. For this controversy sharpened my mind and taught me more than I learnt from volumes of books. 'Nothing can *be* without God; So God is the only reality; the system is Monism"—Such is the substance of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's theory. "Nothing can *be* without God. So God keeps everything dependent upon Him; He is the Supreme Reality; the system is Monotheism" says Sri Madhva. This discovery was the work of a year for me. And now I have realised that the dictionaries and usage are all wrong and Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar is right or that they are all right and Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar is wrong. There is not one line in all Dvaita Sastras which warrants us to conclude that Sri Madhva conceived the concept of dependence or immanence or partial similarity as illogical half-way houses, which if properly pushed by the goad of logic, fall down and disappear, and reveal the level plain of pure monism. A doctrine of dependence or partial similarity is not to Sri Madhva, an admission of tacit or implicit monism, and is on the contrary, necessarily a dualistic creed of two essentially different but naturally related substances. Two entities can be absolutely different and yet be related. Relation implies some similarity and does not imply identity of substance between the two things related. Sri Madhva's conception of relation is supported by modern psychologists. In his "The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition," Professor C. Spearman Ph.D; F.R.S. writes: "Relation can be cognised between any characters whatever, simple or complex, concrete or abstract, that have come to apprehension within any experience."—(P. 64). Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's 'Monism of Dvaita Vedanta' reminds one of M. V. Sarga 7 Stanza 15 which is illustrative of the figure of speech called **विरोधाभास** a form of pun. "Monism" to Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar is not opposed to

the acceptance of an essentially distinct plurality of beings, but is a name designed to mean *Niyamana* (control from within). Monism, then to the author is the doctrine of an Antaryamin, eternally and essentially distinct from the world which He inhabits. I beg to point out that such a doctrine is monotheism, not monism.

I thank my friend Mr. N. K. Venkateshamurthy for typing the work for me, Mr. K. M. Gopala Rao of Katte house for preparing the errata and Mr. G. R. Josyer, M.A., F.R.E.S., the Proprietor of the Coronation Press for the neat execution of printing work. My thanks are particularly due to Upadhyaya Venkateshachar of Chikkerhalli for having shouldered like a brother, the entire responsibility of attending to the transactions with the press and correction of the proofs. Lastly, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the President Raja S. Gururajacharya, Kavitalaka and other members of the Parimala Publishing House, Nanjangud, for making this my undergraduate attempt in philosophical research one of their publications.

## ERRATA

P. vi, line 12 *read* Bharat Dharma *for* Advaita.

P. 4 Footnote, line 5, *for* देहोत्पत्तिर्मुख्येति *read* देहोत्पत्तिर्मुख्येति ॥

P. 7 line 8, *for* 'By becoming a new visishta, the visishta is born,' *read* 'Becoming a new visishta means the visishta is born.'

P. 43 Footnote, line 1, *for* S. C. *read* T. C.

P. 60 Footnote, line 7, *for* the potter *read* God.

P. 70 Footnote, line 7 *for* not not self-contradictory *read* not self-contradictory.

P. 72 Footnote, last line *for* 21. 231 *read* 20. 231.

Other misprints will be corrected in the next edition.

## OPINIONS

1. "Reality of the world, and its creation (in various senses) and other ideas which form the subject of this book have been very well expounded in "Sri Madhva's Tattva Vada" by *ch.* H. K. Vedavyasachar. That the philosophy of Sri Madhva can be established merely by *reasoning* (unaided by the Vedas) has been refuted with support of the authorities; and the principles of Dvaita philosophy are represented faithfully to the works of Sri Madhva. "

Nanjangud.

*Vidvadbhushana, Astharavidwan,*  
Durgam BHEEMACHARYA.

2. "The exposition that since the whole world depends upon Brahman for all its activities in Dvaita philosophy and since Dvaita is a philosophy which believes in *one cause* it must be called Monism, (Advaita) and that reason alone can prove the principles of this philosophy is criticised with proper Sastraic support and the fundamentals of the Dvaita philosophy expounded are faithful to the originals in this book, "Sri Madhva's Tattvavada...." *Panditaratnam Nerur Krihna-charya; Mahavidwan Nyaya Bhushanam D. Krishnamurtya-charya; Mahavidwan Vedanta Vidwan Naveena Nyaya Vidwan, Purva Meemamsa Vidwan, Nyaya Praveena Vedanta Shiromani C. Ramachandracharya, Mysore.*

3. "To say that Dvaita is Monism is unjust as that position is not at all to be found in the original books; it is purely a fanciful view. It is also unreasonable to expound a purely Vedic philosophy as a system that can be established by mere reasoning. That all things have *Svarupa Srusti* is a heresy in this system. All these points are discussed in this book "Sri Madhva's Tattva Vada" clearly and the true position is given in a manner that can be understood even by laymen.

*Pandita Ratnam Maha Vidwan,*  
Anekal SREENIVASACHARYA.

(To be continued on page 2 of the cover)

॥ श्रीः ॥

श्रीमद्भुक्तार्थम मध्वान्तर्गत रामकृष्ण वेदव्यासात्मक

श्रीलक्ष्मी हयग्रीवाय नमः ॥

व्यासाय भवनाशाय श्रीशायगुणराशये ।

हृदायशुद्धविद्याय मध्वायचनमोनमः ॥

### **Sri Madhva's Tattva-Vada**

(A critique of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's  
"Madhva's Conception of Svatantra.")

## **INTRODUCTION**

(H. SUBBA RAO, M.A.)

Madhva Sastra which is based on the Vedas, Sutras and the Gita and other Scriptures which are in accordance with the teachings of these three sources of philosophical knowledge has generally stated the 'Siddhanta,' (accepted position), unequivocally in the language sanctioned by tradition and common usage. There are no two schools of thought on any important or even ordinary topic in Dvaita Vedanta. Dvaita Siddhanta expounded in the language employed in common parlance is accurately summarised in M.S.S., S.T.R.M. and other works. It maintains that primordial matter, Avyakritakasa, the Vedas, Jivas, Lakshmi, etc., are unborn, as uncreated as God from infinite times. They are as undying in essence as God :

“ यावत्परमात्मातिष्ठत्यनाद्यनन्तत्वेन एवं जीवोऽपि ”

2-3-15. B.S.B. This is the teaching expressed in customary language. But there are many Srutis which state that matter, space, Jivas etc., are all created by God. “ सद्दंसर्वं असृजत ”

The apparent conflict between these two positions is solved in B. S. B. and A. V. 2. 3. 1 and in V. T. V. by pointing out that the



word *Sristi* or *Utpatti* (creation) is used in three senses: (1) “**अभूत्वाभवनं**” that is, coming into existence from a state of non-existence. (2) **पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिः**—the acquisition of a dependent glory or some special manifested glory at the time of world-production and (3) pure manifestation out of free will “**प्रादुर्भावो हरेर्जनिः (स्वातंत्र्येण)**”

In the first sense the unoriginated things mentioned above have no creation, because they do not come into a state of existence out of a state of non-existence.<sup>1</sup> The third sense is applicable only to God's forms. Except God, none has that particular kind of 'Creation'. 'Creation' in the second sense is the monopoly of the entire *nitya* entities (eternal things) ruled by God because this 'Creation' (getting of a special dependent office) is just what even eternal things can receive.<sup>2</sup>

१. २ देहोत्पत्त्या समुत्पन्न इति श्रुत्याऽभिधीयते । . . . निखं-  
नोत्पद्यतेहितत् । तथाऽपिमूर्तसम्बन्धपरतंत्रविशेषयुक् । खमेवोत्पत्ति-  
मन्नाम श्रुतिशब्दविवक्षितं । प्रकृतिः पुरुषः कालइत्येतेच समस्तशः ।  
ईशाधीन विशेषेण जन्या इत्येव शब्दिताः । . . . . सिद्धुत्त्व  
विशेषं तत्साक्षाद्भगवदिच्छया । प्राप्तैव सृष्टेत्युदिता प्रधानं विकृतेरपि ।  
पुर्मांसो देह सम्बन्धात् सृष्टिमंत इतीरितः ॥ A. V. 2. 3. 1.....

“रमाया नैव जन्मास्ति चैतन्यस्यापि केवलं । प्रधानस्य च  
वेदस्य वेदस्यापीश्वरेच्छया । व्यक्तिर्नाम विशेषोऽस्तितस्मात्तद्वशतै-  
वहि । उत्पत्तिरत्रकथिता [स्वतंत्रत्वात्परात्मनः । ]” A. V. 2. 3. 2.

यत्रच स्वरूपनित्यत्वं प्रमितं तत्रैवोत्पत्तिश्रुतिः पराधीनविशेषा  
वाप्तिपरा । अन्यत्रत्वभूत्वाभवनपरापीतिनातिप्रसङ्गः । T.C.P. 932.

The authorities “**द्वावेतौनित्यमुक्तौ नित्यौसर्वगतौ,**” “**अजो-  
नित्यः अजामेका**” admit that there are unborn and eternal

God alone can not become subject to this 'creation' for He is independent. But God has 'creation' in the sense of manifesting His forms. Sri Bhagavata begins with mentioning these three kinds of creation and praising the glory of the disinterested God who has no end of His own to achieve by being the sole responsible agent of these three kinds of creation: यत्र त्रिसर्गो मृषा.

Now, if the word 'creation' can be used in three senses the question is, which of these meanings is the chief meaning and the most popular? The answer is, though the word is used in three senses in the Srutis, the chief primary meaning that is universally recognised by the Srutis and by all the Darsanakaras is only the first meaning. It is the most popular and most in common use in Dvaita also. The V.T.V. with Tika, Bhavadipa and Srinivasa Tirthiya declare the Siddhanta<sup>3</sup>. The use of the word creation to denote the manifestations of forms of Hari is unimportant. The use of the word

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things. T. C. also says स्वरूपा नादित्वरूपात्ववकाशादावस्ति ॥ जीवोनित्यः धातुरस्यत्वनित्यः : says the Bharata. While stating (in B. S. B. and A. V. 2. 3. 1.) that these are created, the words "they are said to be, called as, created," occurs invariably. That also means that the word 'creation' is used in this context in a special sense, not the chief sense in comparison with the first meaning, "अभूत्वाभवनं"

<sup>3</sup> V. T. V. p 119—यद्यपि इयमपि (देहोत्पत्तिरपि) अमुख्या (स्वरूपपरिणामरूपोत्पत्त्यपेक्षयेति भावः—Bhavadipa) । तथापि प्रादुर्भावापेक्षया मुख्येत्युक्तम् ॥

Srinivasa Tirthiya, p 235:—

ननु स्वरूपोत्पत्तेरेव मुख्योत्पत्तित्वेन देहोत्पत्तेरुत्पत्त्यत्वात् कथं देहोत्पत्तिरेव मुख्योत्पत्तिरित्युच्यते इत्याशङ्क्य समाधत्ते यद्यपीयमिति ॥ प्रादुर्भावापेक्षया देहोत्पत्तिः मुख्येत्यर्थः ॥ . . . प्रादुर्भा-

'creation' in the sense of getting a dependent trait is also unimportant but significant only in comparison with the use of the word to denote God's manifestation of forms; the most important primary meaning of 'creation' is decidedly, the first, namely अभूत्वाभवनं or coming into a state of existence out of a state of non-existence. So the traditional exposition of "creation" in Dvaita is based on this most important accepted usage of the term. But Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar misunderstands the entire Sutra literature and fails to grasp the significance of the N. S. statement (p. 431).

अपूर्वविशेषोपजननेहि विशिष्टाकारोपजनोऽवश्यंभावी । विशिष्टाकारश्च वस्तुस्वरूपमिन्न इति तस्यैवासौ उपजनोभवति । यथा-देवदत्तः विद्वान् जातइति अवस्थितस्वरूपे एववस्तुनि विशेषावाप्तिमात्रेण जननव्यवहारो दृश्यतएव ।

This statement is made to deny creation in the sense of *change of substance* or coming into a state of existence out of a state of non-existence and to prove that Akasa may be said to be 'created' in the second sense, (getting a dependent trait). The meaning is "when an entity secures a new quality it becomes necessarily a new qualified entity. That qualified entity, of course, is not in essence different from the entity.

वस्य अमुख्योत्पत्तित्वे . . . गौणीवृत्तिरित्याह ॥

Bhavādīpa, p 109.—

“स्वरूपोत्पत्तिभ्रमनिरासायाह”—In this Sri Raghavendra Swamin condemns Swarupa sristi of the jivas—

स्वरूपपरिणामरूपोत्पत्यपेक्षया (देहोत्पत्तिर्मुख्येति) भावः ॥

‘P 431. N. S. इह आकाशस्य उक्तं जन्मघटादेरिव अभूत्वा-भवनलक्षणमिति केचिदास्थिताः । तन्निराकरिष्य-स्वर्मतंतावदाह ॥ . . . . . तदेवं आकाशस्य अभूत्वाभवनरूपोत्पत्तिरयुक्तेति सिद्धं ॥

So when a qualified entity is created, we say the entity is created; for example Devadatta is become (is created) a learned man." The word 'creation,' in this context simply means giving a new trait, while the entity Akasa or Devadatta remains uncreated. It does not mean अभूत्वा भवनं the coming into existence of Devadatta or Akasa (as the result of a change of some other substance; or coming into a state of existence out of a state of non-existence). Failing to perceive that the Sutra literature denies 'creation' for Nitya entities in the most popular sense accepted in usage, Mr. H. N. Raghavendra-char has regarded the second meaning (which is admitted to be unimportant in comparison with the first meaning in V.T.V) as the chief meaning, and from that standpoint reads an entirely new meaning to the whole of Dvaita Vedanta correctly expounded by many writers in the past by the use of words in their chief sense<sup>5</sup>. He even misrepresents the traditional account in his article and makes scathing remarks upon it as if old writers have not been able to grasp his high ideas. This only reflects his misapprehension of the salient teachings of Viyadadhikarana and B. S. 2. 1. 6. He states boldly that every addition of a quality (say a new state of mind) involves 'change' to the jiva, very carelessly using the word 'change.' Every moment a new jiva is produced; and every moment the jiva is destroyed; and we have a kshanikavada involving disintegration of personality.

By thus conceiving the whole world as a new born 'Visishta' qualified entity, every second, he denies it a permanent identity and regards God, the cause of all these changes, as the sole creator of a new world every second; from the idea of creation of a previously non-existent world every

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<sup>5</sup> Sri Jayatirtha criticises the habit of defining terms by using words in senses not current in experience. N. S. p. 197.

लोकव्यवहारः सारेणहि परीक्षकैर्लक्षणं कार्यं । नतु स्वामिप्रायानु-  
सारेण लोकव्यवहारो नियन्तव्यः ॥ लोकेच विक्रयावदुपादानं च्यते ॥

second naturally, he takes a leap to the idea of God's being the only Being, as the source of created things; nothing is eternal in fact; everything is created; God thus becomes the only cause of the world; the system is termed monism. But the truth is, the entities accepted as eternal in Dvaita are changeless in substance *like God* by their inherent nature as stated with reasoning in Gita Bh. 2, 18., though dependent upon God. The Svarupa of the eternal entity transcends time like God and it does not undergo Svarupanasa, that is, it does not lose its individuality but retains it by the law of its inherent being. Yet it is dependent upon God. The eternal entity has Anadi Siddha Svarupa Satta, (as told in N. S. on P. 152.) inherent unoriginated reality existing in it by God's Anadi Svabhava *niyamaka* Sakti, the power of keeping under control the beginningless inherent essential character<sup>6</sup>. The jivas have many natural qualities as pointed out in B. S. B. 2. 3. 16. The eternal things are not at all created at any time, in the strict sense. Whatever 'creation' is attributed to them is in respect of some external belonging बाह्योपाध्यपेक्षया which comes to them as an appointment or a new state without affecting their individualities in any way. It is 'creation' in a special sense

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<sup>6</sup> Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar twists the texts to suit his preconceived idea that everything is created by God and God is the only cause of the world. T.C, 379 expounds that God controls the natural reality of eternal things just as He controls the natural reality of non-eternal things; and that there is no self-contradiction at all in the idea of

अनादिस्वभावनियामकशक्ति the power of *keeping under control* the unoriginated inherent natural reality of eternal things Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar quotes this passage and translates this phrase “अनादिस्वभावनियामकशक्ति” into “the power of *creating* anadi svabhava” on p. 10 of his article. The passages quoted, actually repudiate 'creation' of the essence of eternal things: अत्रतुप्रागसतः सत्ता संबंधरूपोत्पत्तिर-

which only sets off the dualistic character of the system by showing that everything is subject to God's control<sup>7</sup>. The Visishta 'creation' specified in N. S. statement quoted, may be applied to God and all external entities on the lines of Mr. H. N. R.'s reasoning. God for example becomes connected with a new point of time by His will at every moment, with being called Devakiputra at a particular point of time, and so on. By becoming a new Visishta, the Visishta is born. He also is born not in the sense of अभूत्वाभवनं but in the sense of manifesting His will in some way. The Svarupa is unchanged; and the so-called 'creation' of God by becoming connected with changing moments of time is purely nominal, pradurbhavavishesha making room for the Vyavahara popular ignorant usage that God is born.

Similarly, when the jiva receives a physical body which it had not before, it becomes a qualified entity. The Visishta, 'the jiva with body' is born, that is has abhutvabhavana; the jiva also is said to be born as if he had abhutvabhavana, but in

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द्वितानामपि स्वरूपसत्ता ईशाधीना इत्युक्तं ॥ . . .

अनादिईश्वरेच्छाधीना अनादिस्वभावताकथं ईशतंत्रताविरोधिनी ॥

The intention of the passage is to establish God's power of keeping even Anadi things under control, not to prove that God is the only cause of the world, or that God is secondless; or that the world is created at every second. The idea of the soul's destruction is criticised in Gita Bh. 2, 19.

“ हननव्यवहारस्तु भ्रांतः ” T. S. केचित्सर्वक्षणिकमन्यमाना नित्यं न मन्यन्ते ॥ On P. 4. this view is criticised.

<sup>7</sup> See A. V. 2, 3, 18. प्रकृतिः पुरुषः कालोवेदाश्चेति चतुष्टयं । नित्यं स्वरूपतः विष्णोर्विशेषावाप्तिमात्रतः उत्पत्तिमदितिप्रोक्तं ॥

V, T. V. P. 8: तद्वशत्वज्ञापनार्थं च सदेवसोम्येदमग्रआसीदित्यादि-सृष्टिकथनं ॥ See also B. S. B. 2, 3, 11.

reality becomes only connected with a new body and remains unchanged. The "creation" of jiva is also nominal. So too in the case of all the eternal entities. The Visista Sristi of eternal things involves *no change* of substance (विशेष्य परिणाम). Hence every moment God and the eternal things may become new Visistas; yet as they remain unchanged their eternal nature is not affected at all<sup>8</sup>. God's creative power in respect of these unchanging eternal entities boils down to grant of 'dependence' without implying the absence of entities besides God. Ai. Bh. bears out this point.

<sup>8</sup> U. K. M.; P. 10: Sri Vyasa Tirtha writes:—

यद्यपि विशिष्टविशेष्ययोरभेदः । तथापि भेदस्याप्यङ्गीकारत्  
सत्येवविशेष्ये विशिष्टोत्पत्तिः उपपद्यत एव ॥ See N. S. P. 195.  
(1. 4. 6) for an account of the formation of several kinds of  
vikara which gives occasion to actual creation or birth.  
Also P. 932. T. C:—अस्तिच विशेषणस्योत्पत्तौ विशिष्टस्योत्पत्तिः ।  
पाकेन घटो रक्तोजातः इत्यनुभवात् । विशिष्टं विशेष्याभिन्नं । यत्रच  
स्वरूपनित्यत्वं प्रमितं तत्रैवोत्पत्तिश्च्युतिः पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिपरा ॥  
अन्यत्रत्वभूत्वाभवनपरापीतिनातिप्रसंगः ॥

Ai. Bh. 2. 4. 3. P. 144. T. "वासुदेवोवा इदमग्र आसीत् । . .  
अग्रशब्दो गुणाधिक्यवाची . . सर्वजीवानां रमायाश्च प्रलयेपि विद्य-  
मानत्वादेव नाग्रइति कालोपेक्षया . . . तदधीनत्वमेव तेषां सृष्ट्या  
दिनादर्शयति ॥ See also Ai. Bh. 2. 4. 1. That the jiva is not  
created every moment, by becoming a new Visista every mo-  
ment is borne out by V.T.V.P. 2. "नच सादृश्यात्प्रत्यभिज्ञाभ्रांति-  
रिति वाच्यं । सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्यादेरपि तथात्वप्राप्तेः ॥

Further the jiva, Vedas etc. are "Svarupato" nitya or  
"Kutastha" nitya, i.e. eternal in a changeless manner. Gita.  
Bh. stanzas II. 22. 23. 24. are clear on the point:—

Mr. H. N. R. misses this point. This is his exposition. (p. 18):—"So Madhva favours Sadasatkaryavada. This is the theory that holds that a product is existent only as a *purvavastha* and non-existent as product, i.e., as an expression of a fresh change. This is what Madhva means by *paradhinavisesavapti* and it is in this very sense that he holds that Isvara creates the world incessantly N. S. 327. says "Therefore the doership in the real sense belongs only to Him." "This implies that nothing in the world can be said to do anything in the real sense of the term. Acetana does not do anything. The case of cetana also is in reality the same. Taking for example a case where a jiva seems to do something, N. S. 327. says: "Both jiva and Isvara are in the body, (jiva as abhimarin and Isvara as antaryamin). He (Isvara) produces knowledge, desire and will of the jiva by means of His knowledge, desire and will. He also gives the power of causeness to the other causes which are external

स्वतः प्रायो निमित्तैश्चाविनाशिनोपि केनचिन्निमित्तविशेषेण  
स्यात्कच्छेदादिवत् इत्यतो विशेषनिमित्तानि निषेधति ॥ नैनमिति ॥  
वर्तमाननिषेधात्स्यादुत्तरत्रेत्यत आह ॥ अच्छेद्यइति ॥

T. S. T. enumerates the *changeless* eternal entities:—

अत्र नित्यत्वं नाम कूटस्थतया आद्यतशून्यत्वं . . . पंचा-  
शद्वर्णानां अव्याकृताकाशस्यच । T.S.T. (R) p. 7.—चेतनानां नित्यत्वं  
अत्यन्ताभावध्वंसयोर्नित्यत्वं . . . इत्यादिध्येयमित्यर्थः ॥ T. S. T. (S.)  
p. 14:—स्वतंत्रतत्त्वस्य विष्णोर्नित्यत्वं परतंत्रत्वेपि चेतनानां नित्यत्वं  
तथा ध्वंसात्यन्ताभावयोर्नित्यत्वं ॥ कूटस्थतया इत्यस्य निर्विकारतये-  
त्यर्थो द्रष्टव्यः ॥

So Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's Brahma-vada is the naive expression of the budding realisation that even changeless eternal things are dependent upon God, not at all monism in any of its forms. T. V. T. criticises monism:—

एकेत्वेकमेवतत्त्वमिति मन्यन्ते । तदसत् ।



to jiva. Thus He produces jar, etc. The so-called doership of jiva is thus given by Him. The same is the implication of the teaching of the Gita—"Knowledge, discrimination, etc. come from me."

"This illustration explains how rich Isvara's creatorship is. In creating even an ordinary thing like a jar, one can note the real extent of His rich creatorship. His knowing the abilities of antahkarana is to give those abilities to antahkarana. This is to create both the abilities and the antahkarana as having them. Antahkarana is thus a Visista. To give this Visista to jiva is to create jiva as a Visista. Under the same circumstance the knowledge, desire and will of the jiva are created. With them the jiva becomes a more complex Visista. Some external entities such as implements, etc. as having causeness are also created. As a result of all these productions, the production of a jar takes place."

This is all hopelessly unsound. The Sadasatkaryavada of Sri Madhva explains—(see 2. 3. 2. A. V.)—what he means by abhutvabhavana, creation proper, in contrast with paradhinavisesavapti. For example, the production of a jar out of earth is an instance of actual creation. The jar was non-existent as jar; it was existent in the state of its material cause, namely earth. The earth underwent a change (vikara) and so a new visishta was produced<sup>1</sup> involving change of substance (viseshyaparinama, or धर्म्यतर प्राप्ति). This is actual creation. This kind of creation is possible only to anitya entities, that is, originated or non-eternal entities. But paradhinavisesavapti is creation in the unimportant second sense, explained already. It is applicable to eternal entities. When a (कूटस्थ) eternal changeless entity receives a new addition (as for example, the jiva gets a new body), the eternal entity does become a new visista, but without undergoing any change of substance (विशेष्य परिणाम). So there are two kinds of 'visista' creation:—(1) Visistas like the jar made

of changed earth, (a combination of earth and jarhood), where the substantive, namely earth, changes, and the new jar is effected (ii) Visistas like "world-controlling Lakshmi," "jiva with a physical body" where the substantives (visesya) namely Lakshmi, jiva etc., do not change. The production of the former is a case of अभूत्वाभवनं actual creation in the chief sense. The production of the latter is a case of nominal creation, creation in the unimportant sense as already explained<sup>9</sup>. It is called paradhina viseshavapti. The fact that God creates all the nitya entities in this latter sense and does not actually create them does not imply any loss of glory or limitation to God. The absence of incessant creation to the uncreatable eternal entities is an expression of His wisdom. Real glory is independent control, not the ability to do the logically impossible as giving a real child to a really barren woman, at the time that she is barren; or we may please Mr. H. N. R. by admitting that God has ability to create actually the eternal entity but has not out of His own free will given actual creation (implying change of substance) to the

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<sup>9</sup> The idea that when the Visista has abhutva-bhavana, the Viseshya (jiva or Lakshmi, etc.,) has abhutva-bhavana is criticised in A. V. 2. 3. 2. and N. S. p: 434: 'एष चेतनया युक्तो जीव इत्यभिधीयते इत्यादि वचनाज्जीवशब्दो भूतादिसंघेवर्तते । तस्यचोक्तविधोत्पत्तिः (अभूत्वाभवनं) अस्त्येवेत्यतः केवलं चैतन्य-स्येत्युक्तं ॥—The Kevala Caitanya is the self, the jiva without the physical body. The jiva thus defined has no abhutva-bhavana, even though "the jiva with body" has abhutva-bhavana. Mr. H. N. R. makes no distinction between Abhutva-bhavana and Paradhina Viseshavapti and concludes that the jiva is also actually created when the jiva's physical body is created.

A. V. 2. 3. 2. defines Abhutva-bhavana and denies it to many eternal entities: "स्थूलताभवः । पूर्वशब्दविलोपश्च यदिजन्मेति-

eternal entity. God's not having actually created the eternal entity out of His own free will, having the ability to create it, is no limitation. Whichever way we explain it, the admission of the fact that the eternal entity is not actually created by God (as defined in the first sense) is faithful to the Sastras and implies no limitation to God because immanence in the sense of incessant and independent control is enforced with new meaning in every line of Sarvamoola.

For that reason again, just as Mr. H. N. R's conception that Isvara 'creates' the nitya world incessantly is wrong, his conception that the "doership in the *real sense* belongs only to God" is wrong. The author's quotation "तस्मात् ईश्वरस्यैव मुख्यं स्वाम्यं कर्तृत्वं च" means "Therefore to God alone belongs the *chief* mastership and doership." Mr. H. N. R's translation is wrong. Sri Madhva definitely says "जीवोपिकर्ता" in B. S. B. 2. 3. 17. The jiva also is the real doer. Every act is done by God and jiva simultaneously. Both are real doers. God is the chief doer, the jiva is the dependent doer. The

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कीर्त्यते । रमायनैवजन्मास्ति चैतन्यस्यापि केवलं । प्रधानस्य च वेदस्य" ॥ N. S. p. 434:—स्थूलतेति । उपादानधर्मिणो धर्म्यतरात्मना परिवर्तः स्थूलताभावः । अतएव पूर्वशब्दविलोपश्च पूर्वशब्दनिवृत्तौ शब्दांतरप्रवृत्तिश्चेत्यर्थः । तर्हि रमाया जीवचैतन्यस्यापि प्रधानस्य वेदस्य चैवविधं जन्म नैवास्ति ॥ If Sri Seshacharya has given the interpretations that (a) Abhutva-bhavana and Paradhina Viseshavapti are identical or (b) that the Visesya, jiva (jiva, Lakshmi etc.,) has abhutva-bhavana, when the Visishta has Abhutva-bhavana or (c) that Paradhina viseshavapti is not an unimportant meaning of the word creation in comparison with Abhutva-bhavana, he must certainly revise his views. A misapprehension of these three fundamental ideas has landed Mr. H. N. R. in a Kshanika-vada, a doctrine of constant flux, which makes God Himself a mutable figure.

idea that the doership of the jiva is not real is definitely hostile to Dvaita. So too the doctrine that 'a cetana' does not do anything is unscientific. Matter *changes* really, moved by the God in it who really manifests His new forms<sup>10</sup>. The statement that doership of the jiva is *given* is metaphorical for "controlled by God."

The hypothesis that the jiva is made a new 'Visishta' every moment as already pointed out does not, according to Sri Madhva, imply the 'creation' of the jiva. The jiva is unchanged and so, though he becomes a new Visishta connected with fresh mental changes and though he is *called* created, he is not created in the chief sense. And so many eternal things अबाध्य uncontradicted in character and essentially unchanging are admitted in the system. God, it is also accepted, uses them in His sport of world-creation, though He can do without them. And so out of God's independent will all the eternal things are causes in the fullest sense of the term. God can demolish everything and remain an only Being; but His wisdom has expressed itself in keeping under control a world distinct from Him and subject to His transcendent and immanent rulership for ever. Of the many causes of the world, God is the independent efficient cause. In A. V. 2. 1. 6. Sri Madhva says:—शकोपित्यन्यथाकर्तुं स्वेच्छानियमतोहरिः । कारणैरेव करोतीदं जगत्सदा. Mr. H. N. R's view that the system of Madhva is monism because God is independent, and that independent means giver of reality and producer of everything without using other causes, but creating them and remaining the only cause, is relegated to the position of a Poorvapaksha and condemned in N. S. on

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<sup>10</sup>Read the commentary to "आत्मन आकाशः संभूत" Tai Bh. (S) p. 37. See also T. V. T., p. 3. l. 22.

pp. 299—300<sup>11</sup>. A doctrine of only one supreme cause is not the same thing as a doctrine of only one cause without a second. The latter conception necessarily implies not the dependence of the world, but the unreality of the world or the material identity of the world with God. The author's exposition, particularly the views that the jiva has no real doership, that matter has no real activity, are aspects of Advaita metaphysics, while the theory that everything is created anew every moment is pure Buddhism. Also the view that the Srutis and Smritis are only a corroborative evidence to pure philosophy' is a reminiscence of the unvedic doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaiseshikas<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> P 299: किमीश्वरः प्रकृत्यादिभिर्विनापि कदाचित्सृष्ट्यादिकं करोति उत्तैरेवेति नियमः । आद्ये तेषां कथं कारणत्वं । द्वितीयेतु कथं तत्परित्यागेन कदाप्यकुर्वाणस्येश्वरस्य स्वातंत्र्यं । कथं च नियमेनापेक्षणीयानां तेषां पारतंत्र्यं । . . . अतो युक्तिबाधितत्वादस्यार्थस्य कारणान्तरनिरपेक्ष एव भगवान् सृष्ट्यादिकं करोतीत्येवज्यायः । एवं च निर्गलमैश्वर्यमस्य समर्थितं स्यात् . . . . इत्याशंकापनोदनार्थं सूत्रम् । युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्चेति । अस्यायमर्थः । नोक्तयुक्तिविरोधेन भगवतः कारणान्तरविधुरत्वं उररीकर्तव्यं । कारणान्तरसद्भावाभ्युपगमेऽपि प्रकृत्यादेः कारणत्वस्य ईश्वरादि स्वातन्त्र्यादिकस्य च युक्तेः . . . अन्यथा कारणैर्विनापि कर्तुं शक्नोऽपि हरिः कारणान्तरान्युपादायैव करिष्यामीति स्वेच्छानियमतः कारणैरेव इदं जगत् सदासृजति . . . . इदमुक्तं भवति । यदुक्तं ईश्वरस्य कारणोपादानादि नियमोऽस्ति नवेति । तत्र अस्तीतिब्रूमः । तथाच प्रकृत्यादीनां कारणत्वं युक्तं . . . . किं नाम स्वेच्छायत्त एव ततः स्वातन्त्र्यादिकमपि युक्तं . . . ततस्तत्साचिष्यं अतिशयेन ऐश्वर्यस्यद्योतकमेव ॥

<sup>12</sup> Mr. H. N. R. says on p. 1:—"Madhva's teaching is purely a philosophical justification of Svatantra with all its implications." P. 15:—"Mere faith as opposed to reason has no place

There are abuses of both Sanskrit and English words in the article under consideration, misinterpretation of Srutis and Madhva texts and misuse of texts for ends for which they are not fitted. It is beyond the scope of this little book to attempt a display of them all. One remark that is absolutely necessary in this connection is that the author's conception of Svatantra is the result of a long process of incubation on the misunderstanding of the purport of the Sutra literature as pointed out already and secondly on the acceptance of the meanings of Srutis definitely condemned by Madhva, thirdly on definitions of monism and monotheism, dualism and pluralism to which no student of philosophy will agree. Again and again, Madhva has definitely expressed his idea of the place and function of reasoning in his system. V. T. V. begins with enunciating it in detail <sup>13</sup> A metaphysics of God is impossible

in his philosophy. His conceptions are without exception rationalistic. When he quotes Sruti or Smriti, his aim is not to gain strength from it, but to indicate the philosophy underlying the text." In his "Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedanta" he is more clear: (P. 204.):—"In this system reason without the help of the Veda gives this idea." This is just the Nyaya-Vaisheshika view :—

“द्यावाभूमीजनयन्देव एको विश्वस्यकर्ताभुवनस्यगोप्ता” इत्यादय आगमा अप्यनुसन्धेयाः ॥ मुक्तावली.

एवंचोक्तानुमानेनेश्वरसिद्धौ तदुच्चरितत्वेन वेदस्यप्रामाण्यनिश्चयाद्वेदोपिईश्वरेप्रमाणमित्याह द्यावाभूमीजनयश्चित्ति ॥ दिनकरीयम्.

<sup>13</sup> ऋगाद्या भारतं चैव पञ्चरात्रमथाखिलं । मूलरामायणंचैव पुराणं चैतदात्मकं । येचानुयायिनस्त्वेषां सर्वेते च सदागमाः ॥ दुरागमास्तदन्ये ये तैर्न ज्ञेयो जनार्दनः । ज्ञेयपतैः सदायुक्तैः भक्तिमद्भिः सुनिष्ठितैः । न च केवलतर्केण नाक्षजेन न केनचित् । केवलागमविज्ञेयो भक्तैरेवनचान्यथा ॥ इति ब्रह्माण्डे ॥

without the aid of the Vedas. What excuse is there for our author's misunderstanding it? Does he want to kill his system by a friendly embrace of original exposition? It is hoped that this book will make Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar realise that Dvaita is a marvellously well-built castle of adamant guarded by disciplined garrisons of commentators and that it resents even the least attempt at change of interpretation.<sup>14</sup>

नारैर्दृष्टिःतुतेदं ब्रह्मं सर्वानुभुमात्मानंसांपराय इति तैत्ति-  
रीयश्रुतिः ॥ नैषातर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानायप्रेष्टेति  
कठश्रुतिः । नैन्द्रियाणिनानुमानं वेदाद्येवैनं वेदयन्ति तस्मादाहुर्वेदाइति  
ऋषेयलादश्रुतिः ॥

See also Dvaita Pradipa by Prof. Vasudevacharya p. 57 where he quotes A. V. 1, 1, 5; and M. T. N. I. 139; II. 7-8. B. S. B. 1. 1, 3; 1, 6, 18. Also 1, 1, 3. A. V; N. S. and T. C.

<sup>14</sup> Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar places himself in the horns of a dilemma in his article. If in Dvaita, as he states, God is the Only Reality, Sole Cause, Secondless Being, Only Principle, and nothing is eternal and everything is created, the system becomes monism, but the exposition becomes **unfaithful** to Sri Madhva. If, on the other hand, as he suggests and states, we interpret the terms 'Only Reality,' 'Sole Cause,' 'Secondless,' etc., to mean one independent principle and 'creation' in the sense of ruler, we have a doctrine of one principle, which is Niyamaka, that is, ruler of many eternal dependent causes of the world; the doctrine becomes faithful to Sri Madhva but ceases to be monism. Sri Madhva translates the Sruti "नित्योनित्यानां" not into "the creator of eternal entities," but into "the Niyamaka or indwelling-controller

Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's book and article fall under the category of 'Duragama' as defined in the stanzas quoted, and it is with great distrust that we have to accept his exposition of Dvaita.

A copy of this book has been sent to Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar and it is expected that he will recant his position, namely that Dvaita is Monism and that it is pure philosophy unaided by the Vedas, and publish his corrected view.

H. SUBBA RAO.

## I

### The Tattva-Vada of Sri Madhva



[सर्वं पुरुषएवेति भण्यते मेदवज्जगत् । तदधीनं तु सत्तादि  
यतोह्यस्यसदाभवेदिति ब्रह्मतर्के ॥ Bhg. T. 17—This and other  
innumerable quotations in Dvaita teach that the world, though  
absolutely distinct from God, is *figuratively spoken of* as identical  
with Purusha (God) on account of its utter dependence upon  
God in its Svarupa, pramiti, and pravritti, as when we say the  
king conquered his foes where the armies of the king are  
called king. This is Gouna-advaita—figurative monism.]

The pluralistic Tattva-vada of Sri Madhva begins with  
defining Brahman as perfect because He alone is Svatantra and  
everything else is Not-svatantra. Sri Madhva's conception  
of Svatantra-tattva as contradictory in nature to Not-svatantra-tattva is clearly enunciated in T. S. and T. V. There are  
no two schools of thought in Dvaita. The argument of Sri  
Jayatirtha is as follows :—

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of the eternal (p. 330, N. S.).” Another meaning of the  
Sauti is “नित्योदेहतोपिनित्यः परमनित्य इति यावत्”, that is,  
He has no destructible body.—B. S. B. D, p. 574.



The philosophy which holds that there are no *tattvas* is contradictory to experience and negates itself. The philosophy of one *tattva* cannot account for the consciousness of difference in experience. The philosophy which maintains that all is *paratantra* (dependent) leads to infinite regress. The system which holds that all is *Svatantra* (independent) will have to admit that the world is perfect. Therefore there are two *tattvas* absolutely distinct from each other because of eternally contradictory characters as *Svatantrya* and *paratantrya* not-dependence and dependence. The *Svatantra* is only one in number; He is Vishnu. The difference between the world and God is told in all the *sastras*. There is not one text which intends to teach non-difference between the world and God; the difference persists in *mukti* also.<sup>15</sup> The system is *Dvaita* or dualism in the sense of a doctrine of two distinct beings. The *jiva* is *coeval* with God, an eternal dependent

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<sup>15</sup> Vide T. S. स्वतंत्रमस्वतंत्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ॥ and the Tika on this, सत्त्वप्रकारक प्रमितिर्विषयः तत्त्वं ॥—काशी T's gloss. V. T. V.:—विष्णोर्गुणोत्कर्षेणैव सर्वश्रुतिस्मृतीनां महातात्पर्यं । नचाभेदेतात्पर्यमित्यत्र किंचिन्मानं नचाभेदेकश्चिदागमः । संतिचभेदे सर्वागमाः ॥ Pp. 5 and 6.

Ch. Bh. VI.:—मुक्तानां विष्णोः भेदस्यैव उक्तेः । V. T. V. p. 10—जीवस्य परमत्वं तु बुद्धिसारूप्यमेव तु । एकस्थान निवासो वा व्यक्तिस्थानमपेक्ष्यतः । न स्वरूपकतातस्य मुक्तस्यापि विरूपतः । स्वातन्त्र्यपूर्णते लपत्त्वं पारतन्त्र्ये विरूपते इति परमश्रुतिः ॥ . . . . . अतः सर्वागमविरुद्धमेव जीवेश्वरैक्यं ॥ तथैव सर्वयुक्तिविरुद्धञ्च ॥ . . अज्ञाते एव द्वैतं न विद्यते । अज्ञानिनां पक्षे एव द्वैतं न विद्यते इत्यर्थः ॥ जीवेश्वरमिदौ चैव जडेश्वर मिदा तथा । जीवभेदो मिथश्चैव जडजीवमिदा तथा मिथश्च जडभेदोऽयं प्रपञ्चो भेदपञ्चकः । सोऽयं सत्यो ह्यनादिश्च सादिश्चैव त्रैलोक्यमाप्नुयात् । न च नाशं प्रयात्येषः ॥

companion, not a product coming into existence at a point of time.<sup>16</sup> The superficial meaning of the Sastras must not be accepted as Siddhanta. 'Siddhanta' is the intended teaching of the Vedas apprehended as the result of subjecting them to critical enquiry with the instrumentality of the several canons of interpretation as Upakrama, Upasamhara, Abhyasa, etc., and also the other six canons of word-interpretation as Sruti, Linga, etc. Judged in the light of those canons, Dvaita or Dualism between paratantra and Svatantra is the Truth of the Vedas. Statements in the Sastras which apparently teach that God alone existed and the world was created later imply that God is great in power and glory and the world exists by His grace and does not exist as independent.<sup>17</sup> Similar interpretations are to be given to all expressions like 'the world derives reality,' 'God gives reality,' 'the world is produced';<sup>18</sup> etc.

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<sup>16</sup> See B. S. B. 2, 1, 6:—"कालासीत् पुरुष आसीत् परम आसीत् तद्यद्यदासीत्तदावृतमेवासीत् तदधीनमासीत्" Also 2, 3, 1. 7. B. S. B.—"जीवेशौपरस्पर अपरिहारेण वर्तमानौ" ॥ See also B. S. B. 2, 2, 1, 4 and 2, 2, 2.

<sup>17</sup> B. S. B. 2, 1, 6:—सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य ॥ अवरस्य तदधीनस्य साधनस्य सत्त्वात् । . . . असद्व्यपदेशाच्चेति चेन्न धर्मांतरेण वाक्यशेषात् । नासदासीदिति सर्वस्य असद्व्यपदेशाच्चेति चेन्न । अव्यक्तत्वं पारतंत्र्यादि धर्मांतरेण हि तदुच्यते ॥ तमआसीदिति वाक्यशेषात् ॥ .

<sup>18</sup> Metaphorical statements are to be explained in the light of निरवकाश unequivocal statements. Unequivocal statements declare that the world's reality is controlled and directed by the indwelling God, that the world is not independent. A. V. 2. 2. 2. also N. S. p. 330. तदिदं त्रयमपि (वस्तुनः सत्त्वं) प्रकृत्यादीनां भगवदधीनमेवेति ॥ . . . . सत्ताद्याः प्रधानादेः नारायणं विना तत्प्रेरणां विना . . . अभावात् तत्सत्त्वादे-

Sometimes, the world is even thought of as unreal in the Sastras. The meaning of those Srutis is, that the world is powerless and inferior in comparison with God:<sup>19</sup> it is a dependent real, unreal as independent. Sometimes the world is conceived as apparently identical with Brahman, or Brahman is stated as identical with the world; the meaning of such passages is that the world is dependent upon God in every respect though having a distinct existence.<sup>20</sup> The difference between the world and Brahman is eternal and God is the Chief Being. God is always Niyamaka, the transcendent and immanent ruler; the world is always niyamyā, the dependent.

When God creates the world, the coeval entities which exist dependently upon him receive additional dependent traits. The entities as such are not produced.<sup>21</sup>

The material anadi things receive some additional traits. Primordial matter is even made to change (vikari). The spiritual entities (jivas) also receive fresh glories. Lakshmi manifests her desire for creation. Therefore the "creation"

प्रीश्वरायत्तत्वाच्च नतृणादीनामुत्पत्तौ पर्जन्यस्येव . . ईश्वरस्य महदाद्युत्पत्तौ क्षेत्रानुग्राहकत्वमात्रं । किंतु सर्वस्वातंत्र्यमेवेति ॥ So this absolute independence is constant prerana and niyamana indwelling rulership and स्वायत्तीकरण keeping under His constant control. That part of the world which is born is created also by God.

<sup>19</sup> See Nyayamrita p. 298:—"पुराणदिषु कचित् जगतोऽस्तत्त्वोक्तिः असाधुत्वात् । अस्वातंत्र्याद्वा । etc.

<sup>20</sup> See 1. 4. 1, B. S. B; and A. V. 1. 1. 1. Also:—"स्वातंत्र्येच विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि सादृश्येचैक्यवाकसम्यक् सावकाशायश्लेषतः ॥ A. V. 2. 3. 14. also is very clear.

<sup>21</sup> V. T. V. तद्वशत्वज्ञापनार्थं च सदेवसोम्येदमग्र आसीदित्यादि सृष्टिकथनं ॥ A. V. 2. 3. 1. अव्याकृतं हि गगनं साक्षिगोचरं प्रदेश

of unoriginated things means the bestowal of a new glory upon them, *not bringing them into being*.<sup>22</sup> God creates everything in this sense, that is, in the sense of giving everything some-

इति विज्ञेयं नित्यं नोत्पद्यते हितम् । प्रकृतिः पुरुषः काल इत्येते च  
समस्तशः । ईशाधीनविशेषेण जन्या इत्येव शब्दिताः । Though *said to be created* in a special sense, they have no creation in the chief sense :—“रमाया नैव जन्मास्ति चैतन्यस्यापि केवलं । प्रधानस्य च वेदस्य ॥

<sup>22</sup> When the verb 'create' is used to denote actual coming into being of a thing out of a state of non-existence, it takes no (objective) complement after it. But when it is used to denote the bestowal of a gift upon a person or thing *already existing* (as now in the case of God's granting of special glories to Lakshmi, jivas, Vedas etc.,) the verb is invariably followed by an objective complement. O. E. D. is clear on the point :—“Create—invest (person) with rank, as *create a man a peer*.” So Mr. H. N. R.'s statements: 'jiva is *created*; Avyakrita-akasa is *created*; Lakshmi is *created*' etc., are wrong. He should say: “the jiva is created a “dehi” (a soul with body; Akasa is created inhabited space; Lakshmi is created queen of the world” etc. That means the Svarupa—the jiva, Akasa, and Lakshmi in themselves do not come into being. *They* are not created in themselves. But we may simply say—God created Brahmanda, as its Svarupa (i.e., itself) comes into being. There is vast difference of meaning between 'Coming into being' and 'becoming,' as e. g. compare 'the child came into being' with “the child became a school-boy.” The former implies Svarupa Sristi; but the latter (viz. paradhinavishesha-vapti) forbids it. But Mr. H. N. R. uses the word creation in a third sense; that is, as an equivalent to 'protection' or dependence. Such a usage is purely metaphorical as when a drowning man says to his deliverer “He gave me life.” Creation construed as 'giving reality' and used in the sense of 'protection' is Gouna-sristi.

thing it had not before, so as to show that they are subject to His control. Every eternal thing is unproduced in the chief sense and indestructible in essence (in its subtle state)<sup>23</sup>

Further God is always Svatantra, everywhere, in every action, in relation to everything in the world. He is transcendent. He is also the immanent ruler. What God can do is difficult to conceive. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar would have it that God can make A and non-A identical; can give a real son to an eternal barren woman at the time that she is really a barren woman; God can kill Himself, can become matter, can suffer pain, can become finite and what not.<sup>24</sup>

The answer is, the limits of God's glory are admittedly inscrutable even to the gods. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar has set out upon a philosophical enquiry whether the conception of Svatantra makes room for a dualistic or a monistic conception of things. It is irrelevant to abandon this philosophical process and enter into a theological discussion about matters respecting which even theology confesses defeat<sup>25</sup>. God is known to be Satyasankalpa by the pramanas. The question is what God has done and whether He has used His svatantrya so as to maintain an order of things which necessitates a dualistic scheme of thought or not. We must remember also that whatever God does is in consistency with His perfect and all-wise nature and there

<sup>23</sup> A. V. 2. 2. 10. N. S. 412:—सर्वहि . . . द्रव्यरूपेणनित्यं अवस्थाभेदेन अनित्यं ।

<sup>24</sup> Mr. H. N. R. quotes the following authorities:—T. C. 332, 379, 835. A. V. 1. 1. 11. N. S. 293, 327, 330, 513. But they do not support his position, namely that the world is not a product of many causes, or that God is the Sole Reality.

<sup>25</sup> See M. V. Sarga VII Sloka 46; and यतोवाचोनिवर्तन्ते अप्राप्यमनसारुह ॥ T&i. Up.

are those who maintain that the inability to do the logically impossible is a virtue, an expression of wisdom like a particular form of Vaishamya which is held to be an auspicious attribute in Nyaya Sudha (p. 311)<sup>26</sup>. God, the pramanas state, has not at the time of creation given all the eight features, creation, destruction, protection, direction, knowledge, ignorance etc. to all. He has maintained true difference persisting between Him and the world (though He *can* according to Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar turn the world into Himself), and maintained Madhva also to record His activities. And so the system to which God has given life now—whatever He might do in future<sup>27</sup>—has to be called Dualism, a doctrine of essential eternal difference between two related ultimate tattvas, God

<sup>26</sup> B. S. B. 2, 1, 11; and A. V. 3, 2, 10: यदीशत्वाविराधिस्यात्तदेवायुक्तमञ्जसा ॥ See also:—घटकीभूत मूलशक्तेरविघातकं सर्वं करोति—युक्तिमल्लिकान्याख्या ॥ N. S. 2, 1, 10. p. 312: द्विविधं खल्विदं वैषम्यं निर्धृणत्वं च । एकं कर्माद्यनपेक्षताप्रयुक्तं । अपरन्तु सापेक्षत्वेऽपि कर्मादि सत्तादेरपीश्वराधीनत्वप्रयुक्तं । तत्राद्यं वेदाप्रामाण्यकारणत्वेन दूषणत्वाच्चेष्टरस्याङ्गीकर्तुमुचितम् । . . . अतोऽन्यत्तु द्वितीयं वैषम्यनैर्धृण्यं च न वैषम्यादिनामकं । दूषणरूपं न भवतीति यावत् । तथा हि । वैषम्यादिकं तावन्नस्वरूपेण दोषः । किन्तु दोषहेतुतया । न चेदं वेदाप्रामाण्यकारणं । कर्मादि सापेक्षत्वाङ्गीकारात् । नापि जीवानामिवेश्वरस्य प्रत्यवायहेतुः । तदभावात् । अतोऽदूषणत्वादङ्गीकृतं सूत्रकृतेति न कश्चिद्दोषः । तथाच भाष्यं । न च पुनर्वैषम्याद्यापातेन दोषइति ॥

<sup>27</sup> In truth what God will do in future can be predicted with certainty by seers or by those who know the teachings of the Vedas thoroughly. Br. Bh. says—“ सत्यसङ्कल्पतोविष्णुः नान्यथातु करिष्यति ॥ ”

and the world<sup>28</sup>. But it is a dualism made possible by God, and recognised and protected by God, not generated at a time by God. The conception of God as Svatantra, the immanent ruler of the universe or the "creator" of all in the sense already explained does not destroy the pluralistic foundations of Dvaita logic.

Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's conception of philosophical method is foreign to Indian thought. Like other Indian thinkers Madhva subordinates reasoning aided by observation to the Vedas in determining the existence of an Independent perfect principle and the nature of that perfect principle frankly admitting that all reasoning in respect of nitya-atindriya is sopadhika, ridden with extraneous conditions.<sup>29</sup> The Vedas are the only guide with respect to God and His glories, not Bradleyan logic. And in the Vedas neither the concept of immanence of God in the world elaborated in Br. Up. 3, 7 nor the idea of the utter dependence of the world upon God

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<sup>28</sup> V. T. V p. 9:—सर्वे वेदाहरेर्भेदं सर्वस्मात् ज्ञापयन्ति हि . . .  
p.11:—परमेश्वरेण ज्ञातत्वात् रक्षितत्वाच्च न द्वैतं भ्रान्तिकल्पितमित्यर्थः।  
नहीश्वरस्य भ्रान्तिः । तर्ह्यद्वैतः सर्वभावानामिति व्यपदेशः कथमित्यत आह । अद्वैतं परमार्थत इति । परमार्थापेक्षया ह्यद्वैतं सर्वस्मादुत्तमोर्थः स एव पवेत्यर्थः । अन्यथा ह्यद्वैतः सर्वभावानामिति व्यर्थस्यात् । सर्वभावानां मध्ये तस्यैकस्यैवाद्वैतत्वमित्युक्ते समाधिकराहित्यमेवोक्तं स्यात् । . . . अज्ञानिनां पक्ष एव द्वैतं न विद्यत इत्यर्थः । . . . द्वैतं न विद्यत इति तस्मादज्ञानिनां मतम् ॥

<sup>29</sup> V. T. V. T. p: 31, 32: उपाधिप्रतिरोधौ तु कनामातीव-  
दुर्बचौ etc., . . . भवति शरीरिजन्यत्वमुपाधिरितरत्रेश्वरानुमाने ।  
त्युत्तरमनीश्वरवादिना वक्तुं शक्यते ॥

described in the Rg Veda and the Smritis<sup>30</sup> can be pressed into the service of a monistic explanation of life and universe. The difference between the two elements postulated, namely

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<sup>30</sup> न ऋतेत्वक्तियते किञ्चनारे । द्रव्यं कर्मच कालश्च ॥ ब्रह्मणो  
अम्बश्च जगतः भभावात् 2, 2, 2. B. S. B.

A dualism which conceives the world as always dependent and God as always non-dependent only, cannot provide abiding satisfaction to the mind if it does not show how the disparate elements are intergrated into an organic union—(for unity is impossible on account of essential contradictory attributes persisting in the two elements)—that prevents chaos and makes possible an explicable world-order. The Antaryamitva-vada, the doctrine of immanence (the misunderstood theory of God's giving reality to the world, of Mr. H. N. R.) fulfils this function. God does not give His reality to the world. The giving reality to the world does not imply (a) creation, in time, of the nitya world (b) or identity of substance between the world and Brahman: giving reality is a metaphor for Prerana or Niya-mana (indwelling control, or direction from within) in order to keep the world in tact for ever in the ways in which the diverse elements can manifest their potentialities.

Sri Madhva's doctrine of immanence culminates in pan-entheism, not pantheism. The former is the conception of God in all, and all things in God and is a form of Dualism implying distinctness of substance between God and the world. The latter is the conception of the identity of all things with God and is a form of monism. It is true, Sri Madhva acknowledges that the jiva would not *be*, without the God in him. All the same, the *substantial* difference of the jiva and God is admitted; and the difference is accepted to be abiding, natural, and nirupadhika. Hence the doctrine cannot but be pronounced to be a form of Dualism, with peculiar traits which distinguish it from all other dualistic systems which are philosophically untenable.



Svatantra and paratantra, is absolute and ultimate,<sup>31</sup> though dependent upon God. The system of Dvaita consequently is not the dualism of matter and spirit, or good and evil, but the philosophical dualism of Svatantra and paratantra, two related ultimates, one irreducible to the other. But Mr. H. N. Raghavendracher may say that God can reduce them into a unity by absorbing the paratantra into His Being or negating one of the two so as to leave only one principle or transforming Himself into the paratantra. But as it is, our God is Svatantra, by His will distinct from paratantra, and we are Dualists related to Him by His grace.

## II

General remarks on Mr. H. N. R's article : 'Madhva's conception of Svatantra.'



Mr. H. N. Raghavendracher's article in the University Journal (Vol. IV p. 1-36, 1943) reproduces in a nutshell all the characteristics of his book, "The Dvaita Philosophy and Its

<sup>31</sup> V. T. V. p. 9:—नचासत्यो मेदः । . . . नचावान्तर सत्यत्व-  
मिदं . . . मोक्षानन्तरं मेदश्रुतिभ्यः ॥ V. T. V. p. 11. प्रपञ्चोमेद-  
पञ्चकः । सोऽयं सत्योह्यनादिश्च सादिच्छेन्नाशमाऽयात् । नचनाशं  
प्रयत्येष नचासौ भ्रान्तिकल्पितः । कल्पितश्चेन्निवर्तते नचासौ विनि-  
वर्तते ॥ There is no identity and difference either, between the  
world and Brahman. B. S. B. 2. 3. 18. says "मेदामेदौ  
नमुख्यतः" B. S. B. D:—"सत्यमेवेदमिति भावः" The  
Siddhanta, there, is that the jiva is absolutely different from  
Brahman because He is only a pratibimba; a dependent being  
similar to God in a few respects, Real identity there is none  
between the world and Brahman. But there is figurative  
usage of identity (Mr. H. N. R's monism) to denote many kinds

Place in the Vedānta":—admission of pluralistic data, misunderstanding of meanings of terms like Monism and Monotheism, misinterpretation of dualistic texts, and mystifying equivocal phraseology and lastly a false conception of philosophical method.

The author admits that, in Dvaita, God, the Independent and Perfect is different always from the world in substance (21); that there are two tattvas; that God is not the material cause of the world, that God does not change into matter or jiva, that Madhva rejects Asatkaryavāda and holds that nothing is devoid of purvavastha and uttaravastha, that is, that everything is eternal in a subtle form; that the jiva and space and other nitya entities do not come out of a state of non-existence into a state of existence (which is creation or birth as we know it), that when the jiva is said to be born, he only gets a physical body which he had not before; that the philosophy is a doctrine of Ekanīyamaka—one ruler (Sarvottama), whose forms are identical with Him, but who is not identical with what He creates. Everything is dependent upon God, the nīyamaka. No entity can exist without His direct effort for keeping it distinctly as it is. Pancabheda is Satya (real). Taratamya is real. The world is real. "If the world is not real, the creatorship of Isvara cannot be justified." There are contradictory attributes dividing God and the world. 'Asvatantra is defective and Svalantra is defectless and the two can never be identical.' (24) The world is not a part or change or transformation or identical expression, or Viśeṣa of Brahman' (23).

He even admits that the world has the same degree of reality as Brahman, that 'the difference between the two cases (God's and world's) of satyatva and nīyatva is one of kind and not of degree' (26).

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of relationship between the world and Brahman: "पुत्रभ्रातृ  
सखित्वेन स्वामित्वेन यतो हरिः । बहुधा गीयते वेदे जीवोऽशस्तस्य-  
तेननु " ॥ See also A. V. 3, 3, 1.

This pamphlet is an improvement upon the book in two or three respects. The author has given up his Brahmadvaita or Svatantra-advaita; has abandoned the doctrine of degrees of reality and has given up the definition of monism as a doctrine of 'one in many.' But he is now more monistic in spirit than in the previous book. Whereas Madhva unequivocally explains all apparent identity statements in terms of Dvaita, Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar explains all explicit dualistic truths of Sri Madhva in equivocal monistic expression and gives them dualistic meanings *here and there*. There are passages in the scriptures which apparently teach that there is one principle, God is the only real, God is all, God is the only cause. Sri Madhva has explained them as meaning that God is independent or Sarvottama after subjecting them to critical enquiry.<sup>32</sup> Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar reverts to the position criticised by Sri Madhva and uses monistic phraseology as "Svatantra, the All that explains All" (4); "the Cause of all" (may mean material cause also); Source, Ground, Principle, Substance, Basis, Truth or Reality of all (p. 1.) which imply that God may be a pantheistic Reality; "Svatantra, the only Reality (20)"; "Svatantra, the All,"; (28). But he admits that Madhva clearly says that 'Svatantra' is 'Sarvottama,' not Sarva. On p. 15. he says "At every stage, Madhva amplifies in unambiguous language the teaching of the Sruti...by his favourite expression that Hari is Sarvottama—the Highest Principle of all." The Poorva-paksha language of Madhva is used to express the Siddhanta

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<sup>32</sup> Vide A. V. 1, 1, 6. N. S.: 124:—"कानिचिद्वेद वाक्यानि सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैव उपादानायाद्वितीयत्वेन प्रतिपादयन्ति । कानिचित्सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सत्त्वात्मकत्वेनेत्येवमाश्वमेक प्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति ॥ Parimala: अद्वितीयत्वेनेति । एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यादीनीतिभावः ॥ रक्षात्मा नैति । सर्वं कल्पिदं ब्रह्म, पुरुष एवेदं सर्वमित्यादीनीति भावः ॥

by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar. This is one kind of mystification.

Secondly, Madhva states that the world is 'paratantra,' (dependent) and 'avara,' (inferior)—words which clearly reject the conception of derived reality (which implies that the world has God's reality). But Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar says: "The Sutra calls the world "avara" (inferior). It is inferior because it is *adhina* and *adhina* means derived (26). Here the author invents the wrong word "derived" to describe the reality of the world, and gives it the Sanskrit meaning 'adhina' (dependent), which no dictionary bears out. What is "dependent reality" to Sri Madhva is "derived reality" to Mr. H. N. R. So too Mr. H. N. R's theory of 'one Real' is a name for the doctrine of Sarvottamatva (Highest Being). On p. 13. also he says 'the world is paratantra, that is, it has derived reality.' This is the second kind of mystification.

Thirdly, Madhva clearly states that God does not give His reality to the world but controls the reality of the world. It is obvious from this, that passages which state that God gives reality or that the world derives reality merely mean that God controls the inherent reality of the world i.e., that the world is dependent. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar reverses this order of exposition. His Siddhanta is 'God gives reality to the world'; God gives *svarupa*, *pramiti* and *pravritti* to all. Then he translates this "giving reality" into "*adhina* (dependent)." On p. 5. he says "Isvara as the *giver* of *satta* in these various senses is called *Niyamaka* (controller)". Instead of directly stating that Isvara is the controller of the reality of all, he falsely says 'He gives reality to *all*' and gives an explanation which involves wrong usage of words. This is the third kind of mystification. For "giver" does not mean "*niyamaka*" or controller according to any usage. On p. 5 he says again, "the term *satta* in this connection means *svarupa* (essence), *pramiti* or *prameyatva* (the state of being known), *pravritti* (function) and existence in space and time.

Only from Isvara does everything in the world *receive* satta in all these four senses and with reference to every aspect that occurs to it. For this reason everything is called adhina (dependent)." Here 'receiving existence' is used as an equivalent to "being dependent."

Fourthly, Madhva clearly states that many things, as matter and space and jiva, are eternal and anadi; and if they are *said* to be created, it means they receive a special dependent trait at the time of creation though they are dependently coeval with God. In Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's exposition everything is *created*; God creates the anadi, God creates the nitya. Even eternal things are produced. (P. 8): "The natural svarupa or svabhava possessed by everything is also *created* by Isa." Then comes the unnatural translation on p. 8:—"Isvara is the giver of reality to prakriti ...What is meant in these passages is that there is nothing in this world that has reality, independent of Brahman. For this reason the whole world is called paratantra. Paratantra means product." Whereas Madhva says (A. V. 2. 3. 1.) that eternal things are not created in the chief sense and that they receive a dependent trait at the time that Brahmanda is actually produced, Mr. H. N. R. says all eternal things are created in the chief sense and *creation means* dependence. This is the fourth kind of mystification. No dictionary translates "paratantra" into product. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar admits also that space, prakriti etc. have coeval existence with God on p. 7. "Creation of the world presupposes the existence of the substantive aspect of things" "Everything is nitya in substance and anitya with regard to its change." So 'giving existence,' creating, producing are equivalents to Niyamakatva, control, while receiving existence, creation and product are equivalents to paratantratva, dependence in Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's vocabulary.

Fifthly, Madhva says God is Niyamaka of all nitya and anitya. But Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar strangely says God is the *author* of all and later translates the word author into

'niyamaka.' On p. 20. he says:—"Having been the author (niyamaka) of the particular svarupa and svabhava of the cetana...Isvara makes the things produced by the jiva." Which dictionary authorises us to translate the word "author" into 'niyamaka (controller)'?

On p. 10. he wrongly translates Madhva's word 'niyamaka' into "creator": he says "The fact that Isvara is the creator of anadi essence of anadi things...is the same as anadi svabhava *niyamaka* sakti, the power of *creating* anadi svabhava." So when Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar writes:—"God is the creator of eternal things," he means, "God is the *niyamaka* of eternal things," why, we ask, does he not state Madhva's position unambiguously?

Another kind of mystification consists in translating Srutis not in the senses which Madhva has given to them but in their apparent monistic sense and accepting it as the correct sense for the basis of discussion. The Srutis "Sarvam khalvidam Brahma", "Ekamevadvitiyam Brahma" are translated in an anti-Madhvaic sense. So too the authorities "Vasudevamadvandvam"; "Yasmat paramatmaiva tatvam tasmāt tamevaṁ paśyanti munayaḥ" etc. are wrongly interpreted without reference to the glosses. Even if those texts are accepted in the senses given by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar, their monistic purpose is all frustrated by explanations of Sri Madhva to apparent monistic passages admitted by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar also. He says on page 28: "We have seen how creation means giving satta, etc., to the created. *This meaning of creation* enables Madhva to explain the passages of Sruti which apparently teach the identity of Brahman and the world. He says, Bhg. T. 17. "All this, viz., the world consisting of bheda is said to be Purusa Himself, because the satta, etc., of the world are adhina." Bhg. T. 53. "Because Hari gives satta to all, He is called Sarvatattva." Bhg. T. 55,—Because Kesava gives satta to jiva, He is said, to be identical with it." V. T. V. "All this is

called Brahman, because satta, etc., of this are Brahmadhina." These Dvaita quotations of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar teach that apparent identity passages, are, according to Sri Madhva, figurative (gouna) expressions conveying the truth that the world is dependent upon Brahman. 'Creation' according to Mr. H. N. R. also means 'giving reality to the world' which in turn means 'tadvasata' dependence, as already stated. So our author's monism is another name for the truth that the world is dependent upon God in all respects. But the language which Mr. Raghavendrachar has employed to express this obvious truth is very mystifying. Instead of directly stating that the eternal things are dependent upon God, he says that the eternal things are created and then defines 'creation' as 'giving satta,' and 'giving satta' as 'dependence.' After this pyrotechnics of definition, he concludes on p. 28. that by interpreting the world 'creation' as "giving reality = dependence," Sri Madhva has explained apparent identity passages. This is absurd and gives a very poor idea of Sri Madhva's philosophical exposition. The truth is all the apparent identity passages are plain dualistic statements or *figurative* expressions to Sri Madhva.<sup>32</sup> But Mr. H. N. R.

<sup>32</sup> Apparent 'Advaita,' texts are really figurative statements गौणप्रयोगाः teaching in a secondary sense one of five truths; A. V. 1. 1. 1: स्वातन्त्र्येच etc., quoted on p. 20. A. V. 2. 3. 14. N. S. p. 435: अत्र जीवात्मनः परमात्मनाऽऽत्यन्तिको भेदस्त्वर्थ्यते । . . . . " यथाहि सिंहोदेवदत्त इति वाक्यश्रवणेऽपि न सिंहोदेवदत्तस्वरूपैक्यप्रतिपत्तिर्भवति । किं नाम गौणप्राप्यं प्रयोग इत्यध्यवस्यति । तथा . . . . जीवात्मपरमात्मभेदस्य प्रत्यक्षादि अगोचरत्वेन उपपादितत्वात्तत्त्वमस्यादि श्रुतिशक्तेनापि न तदभेद प्रतिपत्तिरुत्पत्तुमर्हति । किंतु गौणार्थाप्यं (अभेद) श्रुतयः इति निश्चयो भवेत् । N. S. p. 451:—सिंहोदेवदत्त इत्यादिवद्वैशेषिकोऽप्यपदेश

failing to distinguish between a figurative expression and a plain statement, and ignoring Madhva Sastras, considers 'रूपपदेदं, सर्वं कल्पिकं ब्रह्म', as plain "monistic" statements teaching identity and as identity between the world and Brahman is not accepted by him, he interprets 'identity' as creation, and creation as giving of reality, and giving of reality as dependence and ends in a glorious explanation, namely, that Madhva is a monist and monism means dependence of the world, or supremacy of God. This presentation defames Sri Madhva and involves the abuse of many English words, and misinterpretation of Srutis. The term 'identity' never means 'creation', though it has five secondary meanings (Gounartha). Creation is not interpreted as "giving of reality" to eternal things anywhere by Sri Madhva. "Giving of reality" is a figurative expression for 'niyamana', control from within as indicated in A. V. 2. 2. 2. Instead of fancifully saying that the "implication" of identity stated in **पुरुषपदेदं** is creation in the sense of giving of reality, Mr. H. N. R. ought to have stated—had he followed Sri Madhva—that apparent identity texts are plain dualistic

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**इति वाक्यार्थः ॥** A. V. 2. 3. 18. N. S. p. 453. says that on account of the dependence of the jiva upon God in point of inherent attributes, cognition and activity, etc., and some resemblance between the jiva and God, the jiva is called a 'gouna amsa,' a part of God figuratively, not really. The reasoning also is clear: **नचकेनचिदभेदोऽस्ति भेदाभेदोपि वाक्यचित् ।** "There is no identity between God and any other thing; there is no identity-and-difference between God and any other thing in any way." **भेदस्वमुक्तौ वचनादपि तत्पक्षनिग्रहः ।**—"Statements of persisting difference in *mukti* invalidates monism in the real sense." N. S. p. 531 says:—**नद्वैतः सारस्थमसिद्धान्तः**—"Monism is not the accepted position of the Sutrakara."



texts; and that if they cannot be so construed they must be considered as figurative expressions of the truth that God is great and independent and the world is inferior and dependent etc., as explained in B. S. B 2. 3. 14; 2. 1. 5. and A. V. 1. 1. 1. etc. But Mr. H. N. R's original exposition<sup>33</sup> turns a Gouna-advaita into a Mukhya-advaita, a figurative monism into real monism. He makes the obvious difficult, while usually writers intend to make difficult things clear. Indeed on p. 15. he says, "At every stage of his thought Madhva amplifies in unambiguous language the teaching that Hari is sarvottama—the Highest Principle of all. To make use of English terms his system is unmodified monism in the sense that it traces everything absolutely to one principle" Which dictionary

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<sup>33</sup> In his editorial of 29-11-1943 to "The Rationalist" Mr. G. R. Josyer, M.A., F.R.E.S., remarks that Mr. H. N. R. sought to popularise Dvaitism as he "understood it" or as it "presented itself" to him. But we ask, why did he understand it in a way opposed to tradition, as no Madhva scholar till to-day has understood it? The point is, systems of thought like Advaita lend themselves to varied and conflicting interpretations at the hands of their own adherents as seen in Siddhanta Lesa Sangraha of Appaya Dikshit. But Dvaita as expounded in the works of Sri Madhva and his commentators is clear as crystal. Its exegesis is exhaustive, comprehensive and unequivocal. There are therefore no two schools of thought in Dvaita on any topic. It is impossible to mistake it any more than one can fail to discern that gold is yellow. Whose fault is it if the whitewashed wall appears as yellow? Is it the fault of the white wall or of the defective eye? Has Mr. H. N. R. discerned 'Monism in Dvaita' hidden for centuries unperceived by Sri Madhva himself and all his commentators? Or has he found a new meaning for the term 'monism' not known to any lexicographer? For to him, monism=creation=giving reality=dependence. Another position is Monism=one Reality, one Cause|one Substance=giver of reality to eternal things=creator of all=Independence=Sarvottama.

authorises us to say that a doctrine which holds that God is distinct from and superior to all beings is monism? Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar ignores the serious task of defining the term "monism" properly with authorities and examples and showing what form of monism Dvaita is, if he has thought it to be a form of monism. He has not done it because he cannot do it. Madhvaism is not monism. Indeed the very conception of Svatantra and even Mr. H. N. R.'s conception of "creation of all," display the unlimited glory of the Lord in contrast with the littleness of the world and bring out the theistic character of the philosophy. The whole argument of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar is:—There is Svatantra, God; because He is Svatantra (all-controller) everything is to be traced to Him; hence, to Madhva himself, the system is monism." The weakness of this argument is obvious. God is not the source of the eternal entities. He is not the material cause of the world. Sri Madhva nowhere calls himself an 'Advaitin,' or his doctrine 'Advaita.' He has condemned Advaita and explained apparent identity texts as figurative expressions meaning that the world is dependent upon God etc. With these remarks, I turn to review certain errors of exposition in Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's article; I shall quote Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's statements and then interpret them in the light of Dvaita faithfully, in order to show how confusing Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's article is on account of the abuse of several Sanskrit and English philosophical terms.

### III

#### Further Examination of Mr. H. N. R's article.

(1) "Svatantra, the one principle of All, substance of all, Reality of all":—Here principle means "niyamaka," or Controller, not identical substance. One principle means "Sarvottama" to Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar also (p. 15).

(2) Svatantra is the Cause, Ground, Basis of all:—The meaning is efficient cause (not material cause) of all; Adhara or Supporter of all.

(3) "Svatantra is the giver of the reality of all"—The meaning is Svatantra is the responsible agent of the reality of all, that is, immanent ruler. On p. 5. Mr. H. N. R. says "Isvara as the giver of Satta in these various senses is called niyamaka."<sup>35</sup>

(4) "The whole universe is the expression, work, or a product of a single principle and this is named Brahman":—If this were true Madhva's philosophy would be monism. But the meaning of this sentence is, the whole universe is *not* the expression of Brahman in the sense of identical manifestation or incarnation, or outer essential form;<sup>36</sup> the universe is not the work of God in the sense of change or transformation or Vikara of God; it is not the product of God in the sense of material effect, as a table is the product of wood. Some things like space are not products at all. On p. 5. the author says: "product means paratantra and by explaining creation etc., as occurring to the world, the text proves adhinata (the dependent nature of the world)."

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<sup>35</sup> "Giving of reality" to eternal entities is *metaphorical* for prerana or niyamana, control from within. See A.V. 2.2.2. अन्यत्रकां शक्तिर्न स्वातंत्र्येणैव एव हि । शक्तीस्ताः प्रेरयत्यंजस्तदधीनाश्च सर्वदा । सत्ताप्रधानं च शक्तीनां च प्रतीतयः । प्रवृत्तयश्च तास्सर्वा नित्यं नित्यात्मना यतः । तथा नित्यतयानित्यं नित्यशक्त्या स्वयेश्वरः । Also 2. 2. 5:—सत्त्वादेस्तदधीनतां ॥ नियामयति नित्यं च न ऋतेत्यदिति श्रुतेः ॥ and 2. 2. 10. A. V:—सत्ताप्रतीति कार्येषु पुमधीना यथेयते ॥ 'Giving reality' to non-eternal things means creating them in the chief sense.

<sup>36</sup> See A. V. 2. 2. 10. and 2. 3. 18. B. S. B. and A. V.

p. 3. (5) "Brahman is all that explains the world with all its aspects":—No, unless 'All' is made to mean Svatantra. The meaning is, the being, the capacity to act, indeed the entire history of the world cannot be explained without referring to God's power, because the world is always and in every respect 'God-dependent.' Such God-dependent-doctrine is monotheism, not monism. If Brahman is all, the system is monism.

(6) "Hari creates acetana as acetana; but he creates cetana *along with* acetana i.e., body."—In Dvaita the word 'Utpatti' has two meanings: (a) birth at a point of time—which is the chief primary meaning and (b) getting a new dependent trait. Nitya things have not the former kind of 'Utpatti'. In the latter sense everything has 'Utpatti'. Put into English then it would mean every unoriginated existent object secures some fresh dependent trait at the time of Brahmanda-creation; or simply becomes an object of special dependence. The English word 'creation' applied to express this grant of special dependent glory to unoriginated things confuses the readers unless it is followed by an objective complement. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar obviously misuses the English word 'creation' and takes pains to explain elsewhere that creation means 'paratantrya' (dependence) which becomes ridiculous. The Siddhanta is, cetanas are not created. Nitya acetanas also are not created.<sup>37</sup> But all are dependent upon God. "Along with" implies that the soul and body are both created. That is false.

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<sup>37</sup> See B. S. B. 2. 3. 1.:—अनादिर्वा अयमाकाशः । . . . अथह-  
वावनित्यानि पुरुषः प्रकृतिरात्माकाल इति ॥ B. S. B. D. 2. 3. 1.:—  
लक्ष्म्याः न स्वरूपदेहयोत्पत्तिः । प्रकृत्यादेः स्वरूपस्य अभूत्वाभवन-  
ोत्पत्त्यभावोक्तः ॥ N. V. B. 2. 3. 1.:—नप्रदेशः कथंचन । प्रदेशः  
अवकाशः । कथंचन स्वरूपेण विकृतरूपेण वा नोदेतीति सम्बन्धः ।  
अवकाशमात्रस्य अव्याकृतात्मकत्वाद्दनुत्पत्ति वचनानां तद्विषयत्वं ।

(7) "Madhva's Brahmapada traces everything of the world to the wish of Brahman":—The meaning is Sri Madhva's Brahmapada traces the origin of the produced world to God's will and maintenance of all to God's immanence. The wish of God does not become the world. Eternal entities are not *created* by the "wish" of God.

p. 4. (8) "Svatantra, the All that explains all":—No. Svatantra is the One that is the efficient cause of the anitya and the maintainer of all; the one without subordination to which no being of the world can exist. Statements which apparently teach that God is All are explained by Sri Madhva in a dualistic sense as admitted by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar also <sup>38</sup>

(9) "The cause of all must be Svatantra. This may be illustrated in the following manner: Cause in the ultimate sense is necessarily one. Two ultimate causes limit each other and each ceases to be ultimate. Further, the two causes must be brought together if they were to give rise to

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उत्पत्तिवचनानां भूततदभिमानिशरीरविषयत्वं पराधीन विशेषमात्र  
विषयत्वं चेति व्यवस्था । N. V. p. 49:—पराधीन विशेषवत्त्वेपि  
अनादित्वस्याविरोधात् ॥ p 15.—नहिपराधीन विशेषवत्त्वमात्रेण  
विनाशित्वं ॥ N. V. B. 51:—जीवस्य अनित्यत्वे अभीष्टासिद्धेर्नित्य-  
त्वमेव ॥

<sup>38</sup> Certain Srutis appear to teach identity. But, in A. V. and B. S. B. 1, 4, 1 ; 2. 3. 14 etc., it has been decided that they should be interpreted in the dualistic sense, that all is dependent upon Brahman. Also see Bh. T. II. 5. 2:—यदधीना यस्य स-  
त्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते । सर्वं पुरुष एवेति भाष्यते भेदवज्जगत् ।  
तदधीनन्तु सत्तादि यतोऽस्य सदाभवेत् ॥ जीवसत्ताप्रदत्वाच्च  
... कथ्यते तदभेदेन । सर्वं ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते तदधीन सत्ताप्रतीति-  
त्वात् ॥ 55 Bh. T. These are quoted by Mr. H. N. R. also.

the world. The principle that brings them together becomes the ultimate cause of all and it is necessarily one."—The non-eternal world has many ultimate causes in the sense of co-existent, irreducible causes.<sup>39</sup> But the Independent cause is one. Matter, space, time, jiva etc., are ultimate causes. A doctrine of only one Independent cause and many dependent efficient and material causes distinct from It is Monotheism

(10) "The cause of all is neither upadana nor nimitta. The cause of all is necessarily changeless. So the cause of all is not upadana. Nor is it nimitta. For a nimitta cause cannot do anything without the help of upadana."—This is unphilosophical. The Svatantra karana must belong to one of two categories—nimitta (efficient cause) or upadana (material cause). Otherwise it will have to be an abstraction. God is admitted to be the chief nimittakarana.<sup>40</sup> The definition of nimittakarana is "generator without undergoing transformation."

(11) "Thus according to Madhva, Svatantra is the cause and paratantra is product and Svatantra is the cause of all that occurs to paratantra."—These remarks must be understood in the light of T. S. T. sentences ignored by the author.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> See 2. 1. 6. B. S. B. and A. V. 2. 1. 6. See Gita Ch. 18 St. 13.

<sup>40</sup> T. S. T.:—सुमुद्भूणा खलु परमात्मा जगदुदयादिनिमित्तत्वेन अवश्यमवगन्तव्यः ॥ Also N. S. p. 200. P. C. p. 6:—अपरिणामित्वेति यत्कारणं तन्निमित्तकारणं । कारणं द्विविधं उपादानकारणं निमित्तकारणंचेति—In his D. P. P. V. Mr. H. N. R. has stated that God is the efficient cause; p. 176: "According to the Upanishads Brahman is efficient cause (nimitta) of the world."

<sup>41</sup> सृष्टि स्थितिः संहतिश्च नियमोऽज्ञानबोधने । बन्धोमोक्षः सुखं दुःखमावृत्तिर्ज्योतिरेवच । विष्णुनास्य समस्तस्य समास व्यास-

It is an abuse of the English word 'product' to say that Lakshmi, etc., are products. They are eternal but become enriched or transformed into new glory at the time of creation. It is also unphilosophical to speak of such entities as Lakshmi, Prakriti, and Space as limited in every respect. Further they are not changes of God as a table is a product of matter. If product means 'dependent' according to the author himself (p. 5.), such a meaning is opposed to English usage.

(12) The author says that God is Ashtakarta—the creator of the "eight aspects that occur to paratantra"; production living, destruction, direction, knowledge, non-knowledge, bondage and release. "The first four and non-knowledge, in the sense of the absence of knowledge occur to acetana and all the eight aspects occur to cetana." Criticism.—The author ignores T. S. statements just quoted and implies that Lakshmi also is created, destroyed, etc.,—a view criticised on p. 14. of Parimala. The point is, the author makes no distinction between what God *can* do and what he actually does. If Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar is consistent to his view, he should state that God creates knowledge, release, bondage etc., to all acetanas. He thinks that God's independence implies actual creation of eternal things in the chief sense. Why does he not think that God's 'independence' cannot be rightly justified unless the term 'independence' means

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योगतः । नन्वेतत्पूर्वविरुद्धं समस्तस्य सृष्टिसंहारोक्तौ नित्यत्वोक्ति  
विरोधः । अचेतनस्य बोधविरोध इत्यादि । तत्रोक्तं समासेति । . . .  
इदमुक्तं भवति । उक्तधर्मेषु यत्र तत्त्वे अल्पीयांसः सम्भवन्ति  
तत्र तावन्तो विष्ण्वधीना ज्ञातव्याः । यत्र तु बहवस्तत्र तावन्तः ।  
सर्वथा स्वरूपस्वभावावस्य तदधीनाविति । तत्र स्थितिनियमौ  
सर्वस्य । सृष्टिसंहती नित्यानित्यस्यानित्यस्यच । अज्ञानं भावरूपं  
दुःखसृष्टस्य । ज्ञानाभावस्तु सर्वस्य बोधनं चेतनस्य । सुखं प्राप्त-  
मसोविना । दुःखं दुःखासृष्टं विनेत्यादि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

granting of knowledge, release, bondage etc., to acetans also? If the eternal entities can be said to be "created" in all seriousness, why should not *acetanas* be said to be endowed with knowledge, bondage, release and other conscious experiences? Will not the glory of God increase by such an admission? Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar unnecessarily checks his original speculations. Can he not say *acetana* has knowledge, bondage and release and translate these terms into "dependence," just as he says eternal entities have 'creation' and translates the term 'creation' into "dependence"?

(13) "Svatantra signifies all-creationship":—Not necessarily.<sup>42</sup> If it does, it may be retorted that it signifies that God has no creative *desire*; that He suffers no second real thing beside Him and so the world is unreal; and that God makes matter also all-knowing, every spirit equal to God; gives 'eight aspects' to jada; creates all things equally and alike, etc. Is all this signified by 'Svatantra'? The truth is, the method of reasoning cannot establish a Svatantra entity; cannot establish the glories of 'Svatantra.' The author quotes 76 authorities and gives a theological account of his own ignoring plain Srutis and calls it pure philosophy unaided by the Vedas. After all, he means by 'creatorship' dependence or adhinatva (p. 5). T. V. T. condemns the view that nothing is eternal:—**सर्वानित्यत्वेचोपादानाद्यभावेन सृष्ट्यनुपपत्तिः । क्षणभङ्गस्तुप्रत्यभिज्ञादिना परास्त इति ॥**

(14) "Svatantra is the giver of the nityatva to the nitya things of the world.":—"Giver" is metaphorical. A philosophical writer must be clear. The meaning is, God is the indwelling maintainer of the eternity of eternal things. But for Him, even eternal things would not be. By 'giver' Mr.

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<sup>42</sup> See A. V. 2. 2. 1:—**स्वेच्छानुसारितामेव स्वातन्त्र्यं हि विदो-विदुः ॥** Y. M. p. 16:—**यत्र कुत्रापि तांशकि चित्रशक्तिर्युनक्तिन । प्रमाणे सति . . . घटयेत् ॥** See also B. S. B. 2. 1. Sutra 12.



H. N. Raghavendrachar means "Niyamaka" (p. 5) which is wrong translation.

(15) "Isvara as the giver of Satta in these various senses is called Niyamaka. Madhva says in Ai. Bh. 37, By explaining creation, etc., as occurring to the world, the text proves adhinatva (the dependent nature) of the world." p. 7: 'Everything is nitya in substance.' p. 9: "Tattva means Prameya; both Svatantra and asvatantra are prameyas":—Does this account favour a monistic interpretation of things? Secondly does "giver of Satta" mean *creator* as well as *Niyamaka*? Is "creator" equal to "Niyamaka"?

p. 7. (16) "Isvara 'creates Akasa'; it is an expression of Isvara who is immanent in it."—No. It is an abuse of the word "create" to say God creates Akasa for God only gives a special dependent trait to unoriginated Akasa. Creates means gets a dependent trait according to Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar (p. 5) not according to any English dictionary. The verb create must be followed by an objective complement.

(17) 'Nothing in the world is uncreated'—No. Non-eternal entities are not un-created. Eternal entities are not created as T. S. T. says: केचित्सर्वं क्षणिकं मन्यमाना नित्यं न मन्यन्ते . . . तन्निरासायैवकारः ॥ नित्यावेदाः । अत्र वेदा इत्युपलक्षणं । पञ्चाशद्वर्णानां मन्याकृताशस्य च तथा भावात् ॥ The position that everything is created is criticised there alone: नन्वेतत्पूर्वविरुद्धं समस्तस्य सृष्टिसंहारोक्तौ नित्यत्वोक्ति विरोधः । तत्रोक्तं समासेति । सृष्टिसंहृती नित्यानित्यस्यानित्यस्यच ॥ The meaning is, if everything is said to be created, the admission of eternal entities becomes contradicted. Hence the Acarya says: "The dependent world has a small number or great number of the twelve aspects: creation, protection, destruction, control from within, ignorance, knowledge, bondage, release etc. Only the non-eternal and Nityanitya entities have creation."

It is true that statements like 'everything is created' occur in the Sastras. The author should explain their intended sense. All these discussions based on a misapprehension of the right spirit of B. S. B. 2. 3. 1. (Viyadadhikarana) lead the author into a quagmire of ambiguous expression that serves no philosophical purpose. The truth is, the creation of the produced world only is in the hands of God but not the creation of the nitya world for it has no creation at all.<sup>43</sup> Further 'uncreated' as already pointed out means not-dependent to Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar, (p. 5.) Obviously, the English used by the author is too poor to bring out the significance of B. S. B. 2. 3. 1. etc. satisfactorily. His language is hopelessly misleading. The author means everything is dependent upon God. But he uses expression which implies that everything is identical with God; or that God is the only Reality. The T. V. T. says that only the knowledge that everything is dependent upon God alone (not one with God) leads to liberation from bondage<sup>44</sup> 'Not-uncreated' for 'dependent' is an abuse of expression.

p. 9. (18) "Even the so-called anadi things are His creation"—No. Anadi things have no creation; they are dependent upon God for their protection etc. Otherwise, this is a self-contradictory argument.

p. 7. (19) "Isvara creates the world by making use of the elements that are already existent, i.e., the elements to which Isvara has already given existence"—No. "Has already given existence" is a metaphor for 'has dependent existence along

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<sup>43</sup> S. C. p. 379:—गायत्र्याः तत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य चोत्पत्त्यभावे-  
पि स्थितौ विण्वधीनता । . . . अनादेरुत्पत्त्यभावेन तत्रान्यानपेक्षा-  
यामपि स्थितावपेक्षा किं नस्यात् ॥ अनादि स्वभाव नियामकशक्तिरूप  
महागुण सिद्ध्यर्थं . . . ईशाधीनतोक्ता ॥

<sup>44</sup> T. V. :—यपतत्परतन्त्रं च सर्वमेवहरेः सदा । वशमित्येव  
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with Him.' It is an abuse of expression to use the phrase 'give existence' in the sense of "control." The explanation of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar is more difficult than the passage he explains. To him "creates" means gives 'adhinatva' (dependence) p. 5.

p. 8. (20) "Prakrti, etc., also are products"—No. They exist dependently upon God's desire. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar ignores the coeval nature of the dependent eternal reals with dependent inherent reality of their own<sup>45</sup>. Or, we should know that to him, product means paratantra (p. 8). It is an abuse of language to use the word 'product' for paratantra (dependent).

(21) "Paratantra means product (karya)"—The reasoning must be quite the reverse. If the nitya world is called karya it means that it is paratantra in a special way, as it is dependent upon Him for its existence though not produced by Him. Dependent existence is not necessarily produced existence. No dictionary can sanction this usage.

p. 9. (22) "Though both Svatanttra and paratantra are called prameyas, it must not be forgotten that Svatanttra is the object in the highest sense."—Both are objects of knowledge. Narayana is the *chief* object. The word object has no change of senses.

(23) 'All without any exception is *actually created* by Brahman':—The same fault as in 18. Non-eternal entities are created; but eternal entities are maintained and invested with special traits at the time of Brahmanda-production. Sri

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<sup>45</sup> See Gita II. 12 and XIII. 19:—प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विभज्य-  
मादी उभावपि । A. V. 1. 1. 11:—स्वरूप सत्ता अनादि सिद्धैव ।  
God's 'giving reality' to anadi things coeval with Him con-  
sists in His controlling them from within so as to reveal their  
natural unborn capacities. N. S. p. 134:—अथैवमकारणं सत्त्व-  
सादिप्रदञ्च । Parimala p. 123:—आकाशादि सत्त्वसत्त्वके प्रतीक्षि-  
तत्वादि प्रबोधनं कुर्वदित्यर्थः ॥

Madhva uses the word Srshti (creation) in three senses (1) origination out of a state of non-existence (2) investing a previously existing thing with a special trait (3) manifestation of forms; as, God creates Brahmanda; God creates Lakshmi Queen of the world; God creates His forms. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar uses the word in a fourth sense, namely maintenance of eternal things which he calls 'giving reality to nitya entities,' and he thinks that this is *actual* creation. But maintenance is a form of niyamana, not Srshti. Nevertheless he says that everything is *created* and interprets his own word 'creation' as 'adhinatva, dependence' on p. 5. But *actual* creation is Abhutvabhavanam—coming into existence out of a state of non-existence; as the creation of a table.

(24) "'Isvara has anadi svabhava niyamaka sakti' the power of creating anadi svabhava":—This is wrong translation; the correct version is, 'the power of *controlling* anadi svabhava.' Obviously creation means, to the author, niyamakatva i.e., control. Such a position is faithful to Sri Madhva but such a usage of expression is unfaithful to lexicographers. It is an abuse of the Sanskrit word *niyamaka* to translate it into *creating power*. In order to support his fanciful position that everything is created, Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar has gone to the extent of translating the phrase "controlling power" into "creative power."

(25) "Vishnu is the 'giver' of Satyatva to other things":—The meaning is, Satyatva-niyamaka—maintainer of reality. 'Giver of reality' means niyamaka to the author also. (p. 5).

(26) "In the Vedanta of Sankara, the distinction between jiva and Brahman is taken to be anadi; yet it is considered to be the creation of avidya":—The word creation is loosely used. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar has mistranslated the word *adhina* in the authority he has quoted:—"अद्वैतिनां जिवि-  
चाधीन जीवस्य विभागवत्." The right translation is "To the Advaitins, the distinction between jiva and Brahman is *Niyamaya*, dependent upon Avidya." Here Sri Sankara's followers

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God's 'giving reality' to anadi things coeval with Him consists in His controlling them from within so as to reveal their natural unborn capacities. N. S. p. 134:—अद्वैतजगत्कारणं तत्स-  
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are called Advaitins (monists) by Sri Vyasa Tirtha. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar takes pains to avoid that term and translates the word "Advaitins" into 'the Vedanta of Sankara' as he has resolved to reserve the term Advaita for Madhva's system. His translation of the term 'adhina' into 'creation' (p. 5) proves that he intends to change the texts to suit the purposes of his exposition. The "creation of all" bought at such a dear cost will not favour a true monistic hypothesis.

This illustrates the author's wrong use of words like product, creation, cause, source, ground; etc. The author should consider the difference between karya-karanabhava and niyama-niyamaka-bhava.

p. 11. (27) "The Sruti says: "Sadewa Somyedamagra asit," and so on. The apparent meaning of this is that Brahman (Sat) was prior to the world. But, because time is one of the items of the world, the real meaning of the Sruti must be that Brahman transcends time, because It is the creator of time. So, the term 'agre' in the Sruti does not mean priority in time; it means gunapurna,":—This quotation proves decisively that Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar has misinterpreted passages apparently teaching that Brahman creates all entities. The meaning of those passages is simply this: God transcends all the *nitya* entities in the sense of being greater than they. He does not create the *nitya*, as actual creation in the sense of bringing into existence out of a state of non-existence is not possible in respect of them. Time and space and many entities existed along with God dependently before creation. God is greater than the world. God is greater than time. But it is wrong to say that God is the creator of time-process. Again the use of the word creator in English, in the sense of 'controller' involves an abuse of expression. Creation means 'niyamaka' (controller) according to the author (p. 10.).

p. 12. (28) "Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma (All this is Brahman indeed)":—The author translates the Sruti as a

Sankaraite does, while it is interpreted by Sri Madhva in the sense 'This Brahman is perfect.'<sup>46</sup> This again is one of the many illustrations of misinterpretations of Madhva texts abounding in Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's book. But, one real means 'Sarvottama' (superior to all beings) to our author (p. 15.) Has the word 'one' such significance, or the word 'real'?

p. 13. (29) "The world has derived reality":—Another abuse of expression meaning distinct inherent dependent reality; not His reality. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar translates *derived reality* into *dependent reality* on p. 13.

p. 14. (30) Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar states the correct position of Sri Madhva and rejects it: "Sometimes, we may read carelessly some passages of Madhva such as:—the world is satya, nitya, etc., it is different from Brahman, Brahman creates the world making use of prakrti, etc., Brahman is tattva, the world is tattva, etc., etc. And after such a careless reading, we may wrongly think that Madhva teaches as follows:—The world is as real as Brahman. Brahman is one of the causes of the world; Brahman has therefore a second or many seconds to it, etc., etc. We may even think that we can support these ideas by means of Sruti, Smrti and the arguments used by the other Darsanas, Nyaya, and so on. But all these are only notions that are fundamentally *opposed* to Madhva's Brahmanavada, the sole aim of which is to establish Svatantra as the *only* ground of the world."

Criticism:—(1) There is nothing wrong in the refuted position and in thinking in the way described there. The aim of the Brahma-vada is not to establish Svatantra as the only ground of the world, but to establish that Svatantra is the only independent ground of the world which has many dependent grounds of many kinds. Read Gita Chapter 15. 1-5. A. V. 2. 1. 6 and Br. Bh. to 6. 7:—नान्योवेत्तास्वतन्त्रोस्ति. The

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<sup>46</sup> See छां. भा. 3. 14. 2. and B. S. B. 2. 3. 14.



alleged mistaken position therefore is the correct position though such knowledge will be useless if one does not apprehend that Brahman is independent, and that everything is dependent upon Him. To Sri Madhva as to the advocates of the alleged position, the world is as real as Brahman i.e., has the same degree of reality as Brahman. But Brahman has superior Svarupa, etc., while the world has inferior Svarupa, etc. On p. 26 Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar also admits that the difference between the satyatva of the world and that of Brahman "is one of kind, and not of degree." Now he is representing this position as a mistaken notion. (2) The world has many causes, not many independent causes. Brahman is the independent cause; Akasa, Time, Matter etc. are dependent causes. Brahman is not the material cause at all. As Brahman has not been the only cause of the world, the world, strictly speaking, is the product of many causes. Since God is not the material cause of the pot, the pot is the product of many causes, God being the independent cause. The authority "साधनानां साधनत्वं यतः किं तस्य साधनैः" shows that God *can* create without dependent causes, not that He *has* created without dependent causes. On the other hand 2. 1. 6. states that he has used them. So by the will of God Himself the world is the product of many causes.<sup>47</sup> It is wrong to say that dependent cause is no cause at all. Can we say that dependent fire does not burn? Even dependent reals have arthakriyakaritva. See B. S. B. 2. 1. 6. Where Sri Madhva admits '*Sadhanajata*' a collection of causes which God makes use of in creating the world. (3) Brahman has a second in the form of a paratantra world. It is eternal misery to think that the world is unreal and that therefore Brahman is devoid of a second at any time.<sup>48</sup> But Brahman

<sup>47</sup> See the passage quoted on p. 14. f.

<sup>48</sup> (1) Br. Bh. 3. 5. (p. 21):—**सद्भासत्यं जगद्भूया त्सर्वेदे तमसि-  
स्फुटं । मज्जन्ति ॥ . . . जमयैतस्सर्वदाऽऽद्यंतर्जितं । न कदा-  
चिज्जगन्नाशो न कदाचित्दन्यथा ॥**

has no equal or superior or independent second. That is why, Sri Madhva has interpreted "Ekamevadvitiyam" not in the sense of 'God is one without a second' but in the sense of 'God is the Highest Being undifferenced in Himself, without an equal or superior'; for in B. S. B. 2. 1. 6 it is decided that Brahman has a *paratantra* second.

"Ekamevadvitiyam" which apparently means 'Brahman has no second' is interpreted to mean that "Brahman has a second, inferior second, not an equal or superior."

That Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar wrongly understands Madhva's position is apparent by his interpretation of 'Ekamevadvitiyam Brahman' into "Brahman is one only and It is secondless". Obviously he plans to foist his own (idealistic?) philosophy on Sri Madhva. He admits that the world is *satya*, *nitya*, and that there is no difference of degree in the realities of the world and Brahman. Yet he criticises the right Dvaita position. Has he given up Dvaita? The passage (33) quoted in support of his exposition by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar is in A. V. 2. 2. 1:

Anu. V. 2. 2. 1:—**दौर्लभ्याच्छुद्धबुद्धीनां बाहुल्यादल्पवेदिनां ।  
तामसत्वाच्च लोकस्य मिथ्याज्ञानप्रसक्तितः । विद्वेषात् परमेतत्वे  
तत्त्ववेदिषु चान्निशं । अनादिवासनायोगात् असुराणां बहुत्वतः ।  
दुराग्रहं गृहीतत्वात् वर्तन्ते समयाः सदा । तथापि शुद्धबुद्धीनां  
ईशानुग्रहं योगिनां । सुयुक्तयः तमोहन्युः आगमानुगताः सदा ।  
इति विद्यापतिः सम्यक् समयानां निराकृतिं । चकार निजभक्तानां  
बुद्धिशान्तत्वसिद्धये ।** Previous to this passage we have:—**अनादि  
कालतोवृत्ताः समयाहि प्रवाहतः । नचोच्छेदोस्ति कस्यापि समयस्ये-  
त्यतोविभुः । भ्रान्तिमूलत्वमेतेषां पृथग्दर्शयति स्फुटं । तर्कैर्दृढतमैरेव  
वाक्यैश्चागमवादिनाम् ॥**

This passage does not criticise the view stated by Mr. H. N. R. at all. It criticises the Sahnkya, Advaita and other

**doctrines, including Mr. H. N. R.'s position which maintain views opposed to the intended teachings of the Vedas.**

p. 14. (31) "Brahman the only source of all"—Misleading again. 'Only source' for 'chief Nimittakarana' is wrong usage. Brahman is the only responsible agent of all. Without Brahman the world would not be. 'Source of all' means 'giver of reality which means niyamaka to our author. (p. 5).—The world has two sources, one independent and many dependent sources.

p. 15. (32) "Being misled by the term Dvaita that is applied to Madhva's thought even an ardent follower of Madhva may try to find out Dualism or Pluralism in this thought":—If dualism is understood as a doctrine of two distinct beings, of difference between paratantra and svatantra, not necessarily of two perfect beings of equal glory; if pluralism is understood as a doctrine of many distinct beings, not as a doctrine of many independent beings there is no harm in regarding this philosophy as a form of dualism or pluralism<sup>49</sup> There is

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<sup>49</sup> The D. P. S. II p. 306 defines Pluralism as "the theory that reality consists in a plurality or multiplicity of distinct beings opposed to monism as a theory of the essential and ultimate unity of all being" Also see p. 79 of Dvaita Pradip where the definitions of the terms Monism, and Dualism are quoted.

Also En. R. E. vol. VIII. p. 809:—*Monism*:—Taking the term in its widest sense, we might apply it to every mode of thought which seems to transcend the distinction between the physical and the psychical and to reach an ultimate unity:—classification—Idealistic monism, naturalistic monism. In the 19th century, the term "monism" came to be used by the disciples of Hegel as designating their own peculiar mode of thought.

*Absolute*:—Vol. I. En. R. E. p. 43:—"The Absolute in Metaphysics—The term is applied in metaphysics to the whole of

harm in regarding it as a form of monism, a doctrine of only one being, as it implies that the world is *mithya*. A doctrine of one independent being responsible for the dependent being of the world, equally real (not independently real) is called monotheism, not monism. The misunderstanding of definitions given in the dictionary, the failure to perceive the root-meanings of monism, dualism, pluralism, theism; the ignoring of words like Bhedavadin, Bahutattva-vada etc. employed by Sri Madhva and his followers to denote their positions, and the desire to strike out a new path not supported by texts is responsible for this mystifying exposition.

(33) —“At every stage of his thought he amplifies in unambiguous language the teaching of the Sruti—“*Eka-meavadvitiyam Brahma*”—(Brahman is one only and It is secondless), by his favourite expression that Hari is *Sarvottama*—the highest principle of all. To make use of English terms, his system is unmodified monism in the sense that it traces everything absolutely to one principle, i.e., Brahman. It is thus far from dualism or pluralism. Further, to call his thought monotheism is not to do justice to him. Monotheism implies something of religious faith. But mere faith as opposed to reason has no place in his philosophy.”: Criticism—Where is the quotation in support of this remark? What authorised the author to interpret ‘*Ekameva*’ as Secondless. Is that the *Dvaita Bhashya* meaning? Can secondless mean *Sarvottama* according to any dictionary? If ‘*Ekameva*’ means ‘secondless’ Madhva’s interpretation of it as ‘*Sarvottama*’ becomes wrong. If *Ekameva* means ‘*Sarvottama*,’ the author’s translation of it into ‘secondless’ is unfortunate. Should not the author faithfully interpret the *Dvaita* quotations he gives, just as Sri

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Reality. Absolutism in philosophy is a method of interpreting reality which starts from the point of view of, and constructs a system by direct reference to, the complete *unity* of the whole. p. 47:—In the Vedanta philosophy the doctrine of the Absolute is styled Monism (*Advaita-vada*).”

Madhva has construed them? Secondly a philosophy which traces everything absolutely to one principle *so as to posit a relation of identity* i.e., which expounds the multiplicity as an aspect, Svarupa-amsa, part, transformation, or mode or manifestation, of the one principle is Monism. A philosophy which traces the existence of the world to one maintainer or Niyamaka or transcendent-immanent principle is Sesvara-vada or monotheism. Dvaita is a philosophy and religion. Every form of monotheism is not irrational, or mere religious faith opposed to reason. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's new monism is the pure monotheism of lexicographers, with the defects of irreligion, wrong arguments to prove God, and ambiguous expression. True monotheism is a philosophical system which makes religion possible. If a doctrine of 'Sarvottama' is not monotheism which else is? Sarvottama means supreme being; the Highest of all principles; not 'the principle of all.' Dependent principles also are principles according to Sri Madhva. If it is said that Monotheism implies something of religious faith, It may be retorted that Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's monism implies something of unreality of universe, or identity between God and the world, and unvedic independent reasoning, and also absence of religion. The root-meanings of the words monism and monotheism are ignored by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar.

p. 15.(34) Again Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar gives a partially correct and partially incorrect exposition of Dvaita *as nobody has given it* and criticised it: "A superficial reading of Puranas often makes us familiar with the creation of the world in cycles (kalpa). We are told that Isvara gives rise to the things of the world, mahat, ahankara, etc., making use of prakriti as upadana and kala, etc., as nimitta, in accordance with the karma of the jivas that have to play their parts in the created world. This is the popular idea of creation among the Hindus in general and the Madhvas in particular. It is popularly believed that the upadana and nimitta causes of the world and the jivas are anadi and therefore uncreated. *It is also believed that God is the creator*

*in the sense that he connects and directs the several self-existent anadi things and with their help creates the objects of this world, even as a pot-maker connects water, clay, etc., and makes a pot.* The idea that the upadana and nimitta causes of the world exist irrespective of God, the creator, is the substance of this belief." Criticism:—The account of this imaginary tradition, is the result of an undigested study of B. S. B. 2. 3. 1. and A. V. 2. 3. 1. etc., as already pointed out.<sup>50</sup> There is no such tradition among the Madhvas as is alleged here. If the author were to substitute "by them" for "with their help" and change 'irrespective of' into "distinct from" and 'immanent principle' for 'creator,' and state that all the things used by God are dependent upon Him not only as a servant upon his king, but in the sense of having its existence, essential nature, and functioning capacity, etc., dependent upon His grace always and everywhere, in place of the italicised sentence, there will be nothing wrong in the exposition at all. There is absolutely no relation between Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's remarks and the T. C. quotation he has made in this connection which says that everything, even if unborn, gets a special dependent trait at the time of world-production. There is no Madhva who imagines that any part of the world is independent of God at any stage; just as there is no student of philosophy so ignorant as to think that a doctrine of Sarvottama-vastu can be called monism. The point is, an ordinary but careful study is sufficient to enable one to avoid saying God created

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<sup>50</sup> Anadi (unoriginated) things and all entities are 'self-existent,' in Dvaita, in the sense that they have *Svataḥ Satyata-natural* existence; not independent existence. *Svarūpato-nitya* Eternal things, as defined in G. V. 2-18., we may say, do not require the aid of God in point of creation, for they have no creation at all. All things depend upon God for maintaining what they naturally possess. But what they naturally possess is not derived from God's essence. It is distinct in substance etc. See M. T. N. Ch. I. 28.

eternal things; or that dependent reality means created reality. A philosophical exposition in English must pay regard to the meanings which English words like creation, product, derived etc. signify in accordance with tradition and usage.

p. 16. (35) 'Svatantra,' the sole Creator of All, always, everywhere';—No. Svatantra is the *chief* creator, not the sole creator. The author ignores dependent reals. It is true that at the time of creation, the dependent causes were functioning only in a subtle form by the grace of God immanent in them; and God 'created' the world by making use of the dependent causes, Himself. But after the world-creation, the work of creating inferior things is being carried on by agents other than God also with God as their indwelling principle. These agents are not independent, but dual in nature; every man is himself plus the distinct God in him; the self has the power to create to a certain extent; In B. S. B. 2. 3. 16 it is decided that the jiva has many natural, underived qualities. 2. 3. 17. B. S. B. decides that the self has natural creative power कर्तृत्व. God therefore is not the sole creator in this system. But as decided in 2. 2. 2. and 2. 1. 6. that dependent creative power cannot function without the God in it, the self is not the independent creator.<sup>51</sup> So we have two creators: many dependent creators and one Independent. God is the sole independent creator, the chief creator, not the sole creator in this system. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar persistently ignores this distinction and employs the monistic language, which Madhva relegates to the position of his poorvapaksha and explains as being figurative in nature. In V. T. N. chapter 2. Madhva says यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किंचिदित्यत्राप्यपरमस्तीत्येवार्थः (See also 1. 4. 1. B. S. B.) Secondly, while elucidating this, the author says: "We have seen how the rich creator-

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<sup>51</sup> The quotation 'नाहं कर्ता' is translated into नाहं स्वतंत्र कर्ता ॥ B. S. B. 2. 3. 17

ship of Isvara can make, unmake and differently make things. Applying this thought to the case of these three entities, cause, product and indifferent entities, it is easy to see how Isvara can cancel all or make each the other. He might have cancelled a different product and produced the product<sup>52</sup> in question. Or, He could have made the present product its cause or an indifferent entity and made the cause or indifferent entity the present product. Further even with regard to time in which product is supposed to appear, He could have made the present past or future and the past or future the present. He could have even made the present pastless or futureless and the product causeless or effectless. *We are thus required to see His karana, akarana and anyathakarana—doing, undoing and doing differently with reference to every item of the world.* So the fact that He has created a product is purely an expression of His independent will and it only illustrates the final truth taught by the Upanisad, 'lechamatram prabhoh srstih.'" Criticism:—This discussion is irrelevant; the translation is completely wrong; and the exposition is inaccurate. We are not required to see God's karana, akarana and anyathakarana *with reference to every item of the world.* It is simply impossible. God does not exercise these three functions with regard to every item of the world. God has the capacity to do or undo a thing or do a thing in a manner different from the way in which it is done. But he has done everything in some particular manner and by His Sankalpa does not change it.<sup>53</sup> God has acintya sakti, power, unthinkable by us. The point is does the conception of God's acintya sakti, favour a monistic explanation? In the first place God has used His independent will, not his Acintya sakti, in creattng every part of the world. His ordinary independent power that is thinkable and

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<sup>52</sup> All this is wrong translation by Mr. H. N. R. and is quite unintelligible.

<sup>53</sup> D. S. सत्यसंकल्प एकोवरेण्योवशी



that does not break the rules of logic as expressed by his sankalpa (desire or will to create) will suffice for the creation of the world. That power (svatantrya) will not create a monistic order of things. Granting that God uses Acintya sakti, the identity conception is not favoured by such an admission. The greatness of God only reveals the absolute difference between the world and God and necessitates an anti-monistic explanation of life. God has used the causes and made the Cosmos a product of many causes by His own will. God has not by his acintya sakti negated the world, or negated Himself or has become an "Advaita Murti."

The only truth about this matter is 'God *can* do whatever is in harmony with his perfect and defectless nature (Iswarya-avirodhi). God cannot cease to be God, because He is God, All-wise. Besides, Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's account of God's power does not help a monistic explanation of things at all. Monism in its only three possible forms—materialism, Idealism, double-aspect monism—insists on the dilution of distinctness between the several principles postulated. There should be only one principle, or quasi principles absolutely identical, or bound up by the relation of identity-and-difference. Pure and absolute and eternal difference (not opposition) such as is admitted in Dvaita is a bar to a monistic explanation of life. The ability of God to remain alone will not make the philosophy monism; the fact of His being alone or being identical with the world in some way, (not of being called identical in a metaphorical manner) is essential for monism.

p. 17. (36) 'Change comes from Iswara. It is therefore paradhina. The state of a thing obtaining paradhina is called paradhinavisesa avapti. Paradhinavisesa means a variety of paradhina. Avapti means obtainment. This is the meaning of sristi (creation). So the production of change means the production of Svarupa (Svarupa Sristi) of jiva. Change is paradhinavisesa and its occurrence to jiva is paradhina-visesavapti.'—Some Srutis state that all nitya

things are 'created' at the time of creation, not in the popular sense of coming into existence out of a state of non-existence, but in the unimportant sense of becoming more dependent upon God than formerly by receiving some additional glory dependent upon Him. That is 'creation' in a special restricted sense. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar has quite failed to bring out this truth stated in 2. 3. 1. B. S. B. and wrongly calls this "Change" which word implies Vikara.<sup>54</sup> Space does not undergo 'Vikara'; Lakshmi does not undergo 'Vikara.' Mr. H. N. R. says:—"An idea in the mind or a relation to a body is a case of change that occurs to jiva." This is untrue. Only

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<sup>54</sup> There are only four kinds of 'change.' They are mentioned in A. V. 1. 4. 6. N. S. p. 195. The jiva's getting a body etc. do not belong to any of these four categories. Therefore the creation of a jiva as Visishta should not be expounded as a form of *changing* the jiva. Also the statement that the jiva is produced when the change (*paradhina visesa*) is produced involves a double use of the word 'produced.' The change is produced in the sense of *Abhūtavbhavana* coming into existence out of a state of non-existence; the jiva is 'produced' in the sense of *paradhinavisesavapti* obtaining a new outer body. In English this is an instance of quibbling. Sri Madhva says "kutastha" eternal things have no change. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar says "everything has change and change means *paradhina visesa*" Sri Madhva says eternal things have no 'svarupa utpatti.' But Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar says that everything has 'Svarupa srishti' and says that Svarupa sristi means getting a special trait. The attempt of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar to give English words impossible meanings which they cannot bear in order to suit his pre-conceived idea is obvious. After all, this 'change' and this 'Svarupa Sristi' imply that space, jiva etc., are coeval with and distinct from God. Where is the room for Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's monism? T. S. T. says: केचित्सर्ववैश्वानरिकं मन्यमानाः नित्यं नमन्यन्ते ।

when there is *Vikara* as when a green mango becomes red or a gold bangle is turned into a ring, or as milk becomes curds or copper becomes silver by a process of alchemy, is it right to say that the thing is *changed*. By getting a body, the jiva is not changed. But the Vedas say that he is also "created" in the restricted sense of receiving a dependent something (a physical body) which he had not before, but not in the sense of changing or of coming into existence out of a state of non-existence. Does God change by moving in the world? While using an English word to express philosophical truths taught in Sanskrit works, should not a writer use it in the sense which it has in English usage?

p. 19. (37) "Antahkarana is thus a visista. To give this visista to jiva is to create jiva as a visista. The visista is not different from the essence or svarupa of jiva":— This is also a bad rendering of the N. S. passage explained on p. 4. The correct meaning of the passage is, when the jiva becomes a visista namely "a jiva *with* an external body", this visista is created (has abhutva-bhavanam). As there is identity between the Visista (compound) and the visesya (jiva, the substantive), when the Visista is actually created the jiva also is *said to be* created actually (as if he had abhutva-bhavanam). But as the jiva has *Avasthitasvarupa*, unchanged identity, it does not come into being; that is, it has no abhutva-bhavanam; therefore it is 'created' only in the sense of having received a special dependent trait (a physical body). The jiva therefore does not change and is not created in the chief sense<sup>55</sup>—the sense which is necessary for

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<sup>55</sup> In support of his view that the 'creation' of jiva is real Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar quotes "T. Pr. 2. 3. 1. युक्ताचाना-  
देरपि जीवस्य उत्पत्तिः तदुपाधेरुत्पत्तेः । नचैवं जीवोत्पत्तिरिति उप-  
चारमात्रं स्यात् । पराधीन विशेषलाभस्य उत्पत्तेरत्र विवक्षितत्वात् ॥  
and translates it wrongly into "jiva's production in this sense  
is not metaphorical, but it is a real case of production." The

deriving everything from God, every moment. What is the meaning of the word 'create' here? The author cannot tell. When a student puts on his coat, is he created? So we have to say that when a man puts on his coat his svarupa (self) is created; So too when a man takes away his coat *he* is created; when he rides on a bicycle *he* is created; when he thinks, *he* is created. Every moment as the new time-connection is given to him, the jiva is created. God also is created and is changed when He is connected with a new moment of time. We will have to say there is nothing 'svarupato nitya' changeless in substance and that everything is pravahato nitya. The jiva, it follows, is not an abiding entity at all, but a consecutive flow of conscious states (a series of new visistas) created anew every moment; This is Mr H. N. Raghavendrachar's logic, not Sri Madhva's. God-intoxicated Spinoza reduced his Substance into a monistic being. Svatantra-intoxicated Mr. Raghavendrachar has reduced a theistic philosophy into a kshanika-vada, a doctrine of perpetual creation of jivas on such simple word-play of this kind. But if we remember his abuse of the word "creation" to make it mean dependent elsewhere, his position ceases to be very dangerous. The jiva is 'created'=The jiva becomes specially dependent when he gets the antahkarana. If this is all that he means, the abuse of expression is obvious; his purpose to expound the philosophy of Sri Madhva as a form of monism is frustrated.

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correct meaning is "the 'creation' of the jiva by the actual creation of the *body only* to be given to him is not purely nominal. For *creation here means giving a dependent trait.*" This means that the jiva is not created in the chief sense of the word creation; but 'created' in the unimportant sense of the word creation. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's exposition deceives his readers by playing upon the words '*production*' '*create*' and '*change*.' Throughout his book he accepts the unimportant meanings of Sanskrit words as their chief meanings and chief meanings as unimportant meanings.

p. 20. (38) Having criticised the traditional exposition of Dvaita, Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar gives nearly the same traditional account of a number of principles with God as the chief principle and immanent principle in all. In conclusion he says: "This explains how Isvara is the direct or immediate cause, Saksat karana' of all that exists."—Here 'Saksat' means chief. When a jar is created, God is the chief cause, not the immediate cause, indwelling in all its causes.<sup>56</sup>

p. 20. (39) "A question may be asked, if Isvara has Asesasakti, why has He created this imperfect world? This question does not arise, because the philosophical enquiry concerns itself with the world that is given and not with what ought to be given."—This question arises on the monistic assumption of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar that dependent cause is no cause and that God creates eternal things also. The answer is, God is not the *only* cause

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<sup>56</sup> The author quotes A. V. 1. 1. 5. जन्मादि कारणं यत्तत्साक्षा  
 नारायणमिदं । वदन्ति श्रुतयो ब्रह्म शास्त्रं चैतत्तदर्थतः प्रवृत्तं । and  
 expounds that God creates everything including jars and tables  
 directly. First the authority he has quoted is quite irrelevant.  
 The passage means "Nirguna Brahman is not taught by the  
 Vedas; but साक्षाज्जन्मादिकारणं the Narayana of attributes only  
 is taught in the Sastras. Next, in creating a pot, the potter is  
 the mediate, chief efficient cause. N. S. 327 says तस्मादीश्वरस्यैव  
 मुख्यं स्वाम्यं कर्तृत्वं च, God is the chief maker, not the direct  
 maker of the pot. The potter is the direct creator. God by  
 His will makes the potter the 'nimitta' of his creative  
 activity. The potter is a dependent maker. See B. S. B. 2. 8.  
 17. B. S. B. 1-4-1 etc. N. V. B. p. 44. is quite clear on the  
 point:—द्वारमनुसृत्यैव विष्णोः प्रवृत्तेः । वाय्वाद्द्वारमनुसृत्यैव  
 विष्णोरिन्द्रस्यैव लीलायातेजः प्रभृतिसर्जनार्थं प्रवृत्तेः श्रुत्यादि सिद्धत्वा-  
 दित्यर्थः । See also N. S. p. 198.

of the world, but the chief and independent cause of the world. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar regards God as the only cause of the world, puts to himself a question which cannot be solved on his premises and gives a wrong explanation in this and the following sentences *without quoting any authority at all*. We ask "If God is the only cause why should He create other imperfect causes and bring the imperfect world into being? From the perfect only the perfect must emanate." Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar plays intellectual jugglery and answers (p. 20.): "This question implies that what is created must be as perfect as the creator. In that case, the created is either different from Isvara or not different from Isvara. If it is different, it cannot be perfect, because perfection implies absence of limit and thus there cannot be two perfect entities. If it is not different, it is identical with Isvara and then the distinction between the created and the creator is not justified." All this is Mr. H. N. R's own view without support in the sastras. The retort is, there should be no distinct imperfect world at all if God is the *only cause* or source of the world. One might even remark that the very existence of a second world, or the very creation of a second imperfect world is a limitation to the Perfect Being. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar cannot meet this objection on his premises. But we answer, that Sri Madhva and his commentators *deny* in A. V. 2. 1. 6. and in N. S. p. 311 etc., that the mere existence of a coeval entity is a limitation to the perfection of God. They argue that the independent existence of a second being constitutes a limitation. God therefore is perfect in spite of the fact that there are innumerable dependent entities coeval with Him. The causes of the imperfection of the world are obvious on the pluralistic bases of Dvaita philosophy. The created world is imperfect because the system of Sri Madhva accepts that God is not the only cause of creation. Though He is the chief cause, there are other dependent causes, and thus the system becomes a doctrine of many causes, with God as Mukhyakarana.—(see also N. S. 311. for further discussion)—That is the essence of

pluralism, the reference to many eternal ultimates, the Independent *and* dependent for the explanation of the imperfect world. God who makes use of the several dependent causes disproportionately out of his own free will *in accordance with their* natural, and underived disproportionate varying natures cannot be called partial or cruel. Such partiality, being the expression of God's justice is not a defect.

p. 21. (40) Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar ignores the dependent causes and is clogged in the mire of wrong exposition: "Madhva holds, however, that in creating a thing, Isvara takes a form that is immanent in that thing." Where was 'that thing' in which Brahman intended to reside if He were the only cause? If Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar replies there are many dependent causes and Brahman is the one independent and chief cause, he reverts to the traditional pluralistic account. Or his logic will land him in infinite regress: Secondly does God 'change' by taking forms?

p. 21. (41) Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar presents the doctrine of pancabheda and taratamya. How, we ask, should all this be if Brahman were the *only* cause? A doctrine of one cause is Monism. A doctrine of many dependent causes with an Isvara, as the chief cause is theism or pluralism. Some pluralists assert that the secondary causes have limited independence. So too some monists assert that the world is unreal. The particular kind of teachings of Madhva enables us to call him a pluralist who maintains that the secondary causes have no independence but have only distinct existence.

p. 21. (42) The monistic bias of Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar leads him to a difficulty when he tries to justify evil: "Even the imperfection or dark side of the world helps the expression of the bright side of the same. This shows how the things are created on a principle. Imperfection leads to correction and bondage leads to release."—There is no support in Dvaita for this exposition. There are many causes of the world dependent upon God distinct from Him. Evil is

made to destroy itself by attempting to destroy others. There is eternal hell for natural sinners. God's hatred of evil is an expression of his natural defectlessness.

## IV

Mr. H. N. R's strange views and interpretations of Srutis.



p. 23. (43) 'Svatantra' is transcendent and it *cannot be* similar to paratantra. So the terms Sadrsa etc., as applied to paratantra or pratibimba, mean that its reality is derived from Svatantra"—No. The jiva's reality is not derived from Brahman; but dependent upon Brahman. The jiva is similar to God in some respects, though God is transcendent and has many dissimilar traits in Him. How can the similarity of the world imply that the world's reality is derived from God? Sri Subbarayacharya's Sutrārtha Manimanjari 2. 3. 18. p. 424 defines Pratibimba: इदमुक्तंभवति । तत्प्रतिर्विषयत्वं च तदधीनस्वरूपसत्ताक्रियादिमत्त्वेसति तत्सदृशत्वेसति भिन्नत्वं । सादृश्यं च तदीयवयवसंस्थानविशेष सदृशावयवसंस्थानविशेषत्वं ॥ Where is the authority for Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar to conclude that the term Sadrsa implies that the world is created by God; or has derived reality from God. The idea is opposed to Dvaita.<sup>57</sup>

p. 24. (44) The author quotes A. V. 3. 2. 42. (It must be 3. 2. 10.):—भानमस्तित्वमपिचैवासमंताद्यतस्ततः। जीव आभास उद्दिष्टः सदैव परमात्मनः । छाया यथापुंसदृशी पुमधीना च दृश्यते । एवमेवात्मकाः सर्वे ब्रह्माद्याः परमात्मनः । सर्वेऽल्पशक्तयश्चैव पूर्णशक्तिः परोद्हरिः । and wrongly translates it:—"jiva is called *abhasa*

<sup>57</sup> See A. V. 2. 2. 6:—सादृश्यं पदार्थेषु पृथक्पृथक् etc. and N. S. to it which prove beyond doubt that 'similarity' inevitably implies essential duality.



because its knowledge and existence are always *produced* by *Isvara*. Just as a man's shadow is a reflection and a creation of the man all the *jivas*...are *pratibimb*as." This is misrepresentation. The correct interpretation in the light of a clear line (सत्ता प्रतीति कार्येषु पुमधीनायथेयते) in that same context, not quoted by our author, is:—"As the natural knowledge and natural reality of the *jiva* also is *dependent* upon God the *jiva* is called a *pratibimba* (reflection) of God. Just as the shadow is similar in some respects to and dependent upon the man whose shadow it is, so all the *jivas* including *Caturmukha* are *pratibimb*as of God." The comparison of the *jiva* to the shadow is *not in respect of createdness*, but in respect of (i) partial similarity of nature (2) and dependence upon another.

p. 25 (45) Certain statements of Mr. H. N. Raghavendra-char are foreign to *Dvaita*. For example: "Brahman is *paramartha* in the sense that it gives reality to all. For this reason Brahman is *Advaita* or *Advitiya*, Secondless and Superiorless." :— *Dvaita* does not maintain a God that gives reality to entities which have no reality or which cannot take reality being coeval. Brahman is not Secondless. It is devoid of an equal or superior. The *Sruti* is wrongly translated. The word '*paramartha*' means Supreme Being and indicates the idea of God's transcendence, not merely 'giving reality' i.e., controlling power.

p. 25. (46) "Further, to call the world *Satya* (real) proves the *paratantra* character of the world."—No. Reality is not another name for dependence; nor can the 'reality' of the world by itself be used as an argument to prove that the world is dependent. Can we say that the world is dependent because it is real? The *Sruti* quoted in support of this position is hostile to the author: A. V. 1. 1. 6:—सद्भावं यापयेद्यस्मात् सत्यं तत्तेन कथ्यते । As usual, the author wrongly translates this:—"Brahman is *Satya* because it *gives satva* to the world. This is the meaning of *Sristi* (creation)."—The correct meaning is "God causes the (born) world to possess existence. He is called *Satya*, because He is the creator of the (born) world."

p. 28. (47) On p. 28 there is a piece of logic which is hard to understand: "we must abandon the apparent meaning of Sruti and study the implication of the *abheda* or identity taught by it. This implication consists only in recognizing the fact that Brahman is the *Giver of reality* to the world. Thus Sri Madhva explains *abheda* by employing the same conceptions, Svatantra and paratantra, that point out *bheda* between the two. *Bheda* (difference) according to him is thus an *expression* of *abheda* (identity) as taught by the Sruti. *Abheda* (identity) *implies* that paratantra can never be separated from Svatantra, i.e., it can never exist independent of Svatantra. Paratantra is therefore *ananya* (identical) but Brahman is transcendent":—All this is unsound. Difference and identity are opposed. It is therefore wrong to say that *difference* is the *expression* of identity just as it is wrong to say that light is the expression of darkness or vice-versa. Sri Madhva rejects the conception of identity-and-difference also. To Sri Madhva non-difference between the world and Brahman is false; metaphorical expressions of identity are found in the Vedas to indicate the glory of God as in the statement "Rama is a lion." But Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar says that *Identity* is the chief meaning of the Vedas and '*bheda*' or difference is '*gouna*,' metaphorical and adds that *identity* means *giver of reality*. *Abheda* statements are *gouna* (figurative) to Sri Madhva; *Bheda* statements are *gouna* to Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar. What again is the meaning of saying that *bheda* is the *expression* of *abheda*? What is the meaning of the word *expression* or of the word '*implies*' which we have italicised. Where is the authority to prove that *bheda* is an expression of *abheda*? Sri Madhva says in V, T. V. संतिच मेदे सर्वागमाः । मेदवा-  
क्यज्ञमेव प्रबल्यं । सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वाभावेदे तात्पर्यं वाक्यस्य ॥  
नवामेदे तात्पर्यमित् न किंचिन्मानं । etc.

p. 28. (48) The author quotes authorities and gives meanings opposed to Sri Madhva: (a) "यस्मात् परमात्मैव तत्त्वं तस्मा-  
त्तमेव कदाचिन्मुक्तः :—Paramatman alone is Tattva. There-

fore the wise see Him only. Bhg. T. p. 3." Criticism—On p. 3. alone of Bhg. T. the word "Tattva" is defined thus: अतीताना-  
गते काले यत्तादृश-दायते । कुतश्चिदन्यथानेयात् तत्तत्त्वं तत्त्वविदो  
विदुः—"That principle which remains in the past and in future as now without undergoing the least transformation from any cause is known to be Tattva by knowers of Tattva." Then comes the quoted passage which means 'The wise see God alone because He alone is the Tattva, the one independent changeless being.' If *Tattva* is so defined God is the only *Tattva*.

(b) "Brahman is the only one and It is secondless (Ekamevadvitiam Brahma)," says our author,—No. Chapter VI Ch. Up. B. interprets it thus:—एकमेवाद्वितीयं स्वगत-  
समानवर्जितं च मेदामेद निवृत्यर्थ एव शब्दो अवधारकः ।—Brahman is undifferentiated in Himself and unequalled.

(c) Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar misinterprets the statement: Tai Bh. 9. "सर्वं सर्वप्रदत्वात् । All this is He because He is the giver of all this."—Not correct. The Bhashya commentator says:—आकाशस्थितं परंब्रह्मसत्ता प्रतीत्यादि सर्व-  
प्रदत्वात् सर्वनामकमित्प्राप्तीति ।—Tai. Bh. S. 96:—"God resides in Akasa by the name Sarva and is so called because He is the sole responsible maintainer of Satta etc. of the world."

(d) Again Bhg. T. 59. passage is misinterpreted:—"न वेदेष्वल्पबुद्धीनां ब्रह्मतत्त्वं समीक्षते । महाबुद्धिस्तु वेदेषु पश्येत् ब्रह्मैव-  
केवलं । those that have little or no knowledge do not see Brahman as the only meaning of the Vedas; but he alone who has pure knowledge sees only Brahman as taught by them."—No. The correct meaning according to Yadupatya and other commentaries is "Those that are dull of understanding cannot discern that Brahman is the chief meaning of the Vedas. He who is very intelligent discerns Brahman alone as

the *chief meaning* of all all the Vedas by the method of *pada samanavaya and vakya samanavaya*." The Vedas have three meanings. Only the wise can discern God as the chief meaning of them. Rg. Bh. p. 3. त्रयोऽर्थाः सर्ववेदेषु । V. T. V. अवांतरं तत्परत्वं तदन्यत् ॥ p. 4.

(e) The A. V. 1. 1. 5. Stanza तस्मात् शास्त्रेण जिज्ञास्यं असदीयं गुणार्णवं । वाऽदेवमद्वंद्वं परं ब्रह्माखिलोत्तमं ॥ is interpreted as "Therefore the object of enquiry is the Dearest, the All-complete, Vasudeva, the *Secondless*, Parabrahman the Highest."—Not correct. N. S. (p. 122.) translates 'Advandvam' into 'asamam without an equal.' So the correct interpretation is: "Therefore our Parabrahman, full of auspicious attributes, *unequalled* and called Vasudeva, the Highest of all beings must be made the object of (Vedic) inquiry."

(f) On p. 29. the author quotes A. V. 3. 2. 46:—अतोऽनंत गुणात्मको भगवान् एकएवतु । उच्यते सर्व वेदैश्च ॥ and says "So Sri Madhva concludes "Bhagavan, and Bhagavan only, is taught by all the Vedas."—The reference ought to be, not 3. 2. 46 but 3. 2. 15. The intended meaning is that the *chief meaning* of the entire Vedas is Brahman of infinite attributes." (See N. S. p. 523.) If all the Vedas teach only Brahman and nothing else, how could we know the existence of other spiritual entities?

(g) The author quotes Bhg. T. 21. on p. 29:—सत्तादि यत् स्वतो विष्णोः तस्मादन्यः ससर्वतः । यत्सत्तादिरतोऽन्यस्यनान्यत्वं मेदिनोपितु and wrongly interprets it without reference to the glosses: "Because Satta etc. of Vishnu are Svatantra, He is different (Anyā) from the world. And because all else derives Satta, etc. from Brahman, though it is by nature different from Brahman, it is identical (ananya) with Brahman."—No. The correct version of the italicised sentence should be "As the

atta of all else different from Brahman is dependent upon Brahman, though all is really different from Brahman, it is *spoken of (figuratively)* as if it were identical with Brahman." See also Bhg. T. 2. 6. 15.

(h) On p. 27 Mr. H. N. R. quotes Bhg. T. 125:—**चेतनत्वं स्वतन्त्रत्वं सच्चैको विष्णुरेवतु** and **वस्तुस्तत्तु मुद्दिष्टं अस्वतन्त्रं अवस्तुच** and writes: "These expressions mean that from the standpoint of Brahman the world is neither *sat* nor *vastu* and the so-called *cetana* is not *cetana*":—This is absurd. The phrase *from the standpoint of Brahman* is very badly misused. The correct meaning is: "If the word *cetana* is defined as independent knower then Vishnu is the only *cetana*: If the word *Vastu* is defined as independent Being then God is the only *Vastu*."

(49) Many of the quotations given by the author are misinterpreted and misused. On one occasion, the writer quotes Sri Madhva's explanation that God is called 'Advaita' because of his power of destroying Dvaita which means delusion according to a special interpretation. Does this quotation prove Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's monism in Dvaita? (See V. T. V. Ch. I. **अज्ञानिनां पक्षे एव द्वैतं न विद्यते इत्यर्थः**)

(50) The gross abuse of Sanskrit and English words in the exposition of our author becomes apparent to one who considers the following illustrations:—(1) 'Author of all' is interpreted as *Niyamaka* (ruler) on p. 20. (2) The Sanskrit word *Adhina* (dependent) is translated into *derived* on p. 26. (3) The English word *creation* is interpreted as 'Adhinatva' (dependence) on p. 5. (4) *Creator* is turned into *Niyamaka* (ruler) on p. 10. (5) *Derived reality* is translated into *dependent* on p. 13. and (6) 'Giver of reality' is translated into *Niyamaka* (ruler) on p. 15. (7) One Real, All, Secondless and other monistic expressions are paraphrased into "Sarvottama"

(Highest Being) on p. 15. (8) 'Paratantra (dependent) means product,' says he, on p. 5. (9) On page 28. the term Abheda (identity) itself is expounded as meaning 'river of reality,' which again, as already stated, means Niyamaka. Bheda (difference) is used for derived reality=dependence. 'Bheda' is the expression of *abheda* has to mean that dependence is expression of Niyamana. (10) The definitions of Monism and Monotheism are the most curious of all:—"At every stage of his thought Sri Madhva amplifies in unambiguous language his favourite expression Hari is Sarvottama—the highest principle of all. To make use of English terms, his system is 'unmodified monism in the sense that it traces everything absolutely to one principle i.e. Brahman. It is thus far from dualism and pluralism. Further to call his thought monotheism is not to do justice to him. Monotheism implies something of religious faith. But mere faith as opposed to reason has no place in his philosophy." No student of philosophy will agree to this. Who will say that a doctrine of God as Sarvottama (superior to an absolutely distinct real world) is monism? Who, again, will say that monotheism is mere religion opposed to reason? Is all religion irrational? Does Sri Madhva deny religion? Let the reader judge for himself and accept the views of Mr. H. N. R. with caution. Mr. H. N. R. has converted a doctrine of dependence into a doctrine of identity by wrong use of words and plausible reasoning.

## V

Dvaita and Mr. H. N. Baghavendrachar's view.



In V. T. V. and in A. V. 3. 3. 1. Sri Madhva states the summary of his teachings: V. T. V. p. 4:—*सर्वविष्णोः सर्वोत्तमोऽहं* सर्वसर्वं सर्वमिदं । The conclusion, that all the Vedas have for their chief intended teaching the superiority of Brahman to all other beings is reasonable also. A. V. 3. 3. 1:—

अदोषगुणत्वं सर्वदोष समुज्झातिः । ऽन्योन्याच्च तत्तन्त्रमिति  
 सम्यग्विनिर्णयः ।—Absolute Perfection and defectlessness of  
 Brahman, dependence of everything else upon Him—this is  
 the correct decided teaching.

The reasoning for and the corollary of this position is  
 stated in the next stanza:—स्वतंत्रत्वं सदातस्य तस्य भेदश्च  
 सर्वतः । अदोषत्वस्य सिद्ध्यर्थं यदभेदेतदन्वयः ॥ Brahman is perfect  
 and defectless because He is independent. This independence  
 must be predicated of Brahman in order to establish His  
 defectlessness.<sup>58</sup> Also absolute difference from everything  
 other than Him should be predicated to Him to establish His  
 defectlessness. At the same time, if identity is predicated,  
 Brahman becomes defective.

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<sup>58</sup> According to Bradley, the absolutist, only the independent can be real, non-self-contradictory; reality is therefore one; the independent is unrelated. But Sri Madhva's conceptions of independence, reality, relation and oneness are quite different. Dependent reality, independent reality in the midst of and along with a dependent many; related independence are not self-contradictory conceptions to Sri Madhva. Difference from and relation to an essentially distinct but dependent many are the indispensable features of a system which maintains a *perfect* being free from all defects. The dualism of Svatantra and Ananta is the logical corollary of a 'Perfectionist' doctrine according to Sri Madhva; that is, the perfection of God taught in the Upanishads can be maintained only by accepting that the real world is distinct from and dependent upon God. But Monism is the logical corollary of a perfectionist doctrine to the Absolutists like the Advaitins etc.; that is, if Reality is held to be pure and spotless, it must be predicateless, unrelated and without a second (the world). The former explains life; the latter explains away the fact of life. Read A.V. 2. 2. 6.

The question arises why this difference should be accepted as absolute. The answer is तत्त्वत्वं च संकनामपि-  
तद्गुण पूर्तये । उक्तवद्वदि मेदम् ॥ Dependence upon God must  
be predicated of even the liberated souls in order to establish  
the perfection of God. For the same reason, difference also  
from Brahman should be predicated of the liberated.

Will not the concept of identity-and difference solve the  
problem? The answer is, no:—मेदाभेदेऽप्यभेदेन दोषाणाम-  
पिसम्भवः । If identity-and-difference between Brahman and  
the world is accepted, the element of identity makes Brah-  
man defective. In identity-and-difference, if the element  
of difference cannot drive out identity, it is nominal difference  
and so it cannot preserve Brahman from defects. Pure difference alone is capable of negating identity between  
the world and Brahman and making possible the  
conception of Brahman as defectless.

The next question is whether the perfection of God is not  
affected by the admission that eternal entities are coeval with  
God. The answer is given in A. V. 2. 1. Sutra 19, and N. S.  
299 quoted on p. 14. The conclusion is “साधनानां साधनत्वं  
यदात्माभीनमिष्यते । तदा साधन सम्पत्तिरैश्वर्यद्योतिकाभवेत् ॥  
The meaning is, the mere existence of a second thing cannot  
constitute a limitation to God. The independent existence of a  
second thing constitutes a limitation to God; on the other  
hand, the dependent existence of coevals expresses the richness  
of God's glory

The further question is, will not the existence of an  
'anadi' principle uncreated by God in the chief sense imply  
its independence of God in point of its existence? "No" say  
A. V. 2. 2. 2 and T. C. 379, etc. "Anadi" things have no  
creation; the glory of the Lord does not suffer even if the  
'Anadi' things are said to be not dependent upon God in respect  
of qualities which they do not possess. But even anadi things are



dependent upon God for their existence, and other qualities which they possess, as the shadow has a distinct co-existence dependent upon the man whose shadow it is.<sup>59</sup> Distinct existence and dependent existence are not contradictories. As told in B. S. B. 2. 3. 15 the jiva is an eternal nirupadhika pratibimba of the Lord, not produced by Him, but never independent of Him in any quality *he has*. B. S. B. 2. 3. 15. T. P. p. 119 says:—नित्यएवजीवः । बिम्बस्य परमात्मनो अनाद्यनन्तत्वात् । उपाधेश्च सत्त्वपरमात्मभाषित्वात् । . . . तथा उपाधेश्चैव नित्यत्वाच्चैव जीवो विनश्यति । स्वरूपत्वादुपाधेश्च न मित्रोपाधि कल्पनम् ॥

The Svarupa Srshti<sup>60</sup> of the entire dependent world (second to God) is denied in A. V. 1. 4. 6 and 2. 3. 1. as it involves the creation of things without a material cause or implies that Brahman is the material cause of the world. N. S. p. 431:—सोपादानादिसर्वा सृष्टिर्दृष्टा । न चाकाशोत्पत्तावुपादानमस्ति । न च ब्रह्मण उपादानत्सुप्रपद्ये इति प्रकृत्यधिकरणे निर्दिष्टं ॥ p. 199:—ब्रह्मजगती नोपादोन्नोद्यदेवभाववती, etc. B. S. B. 2. 1. 4. A. V. 2. 2. 8. state that the creation of something out of nothing cannot be accepted. One sentence may be quoted:—

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<sup>59</sup> The passage T, C. 379 referred to is quoted on p. 43 f. See also p. 14 f.

<sup>60</sup> Svarupa Srshti (Svarupena srshti) means the creation of the thing itself. A table or a jar has Svarupa Srshti. The table itself was non-existent and came into being out of its material cause. But the jiva was existent before the time of creation and so has no svarupa Srshti. But the jiva may be created 'dehi,' or the 'ruler of a country.' Such creation consists in the investment of the jiva with a new glory which he had not before. But it is not a case of Svarupa sristi. If the jiva were the transformation of another thing as the table is the transformation of wood, it would be right to say, that the jiva also has Svarupa Srshti. Read M. T. N. Ch. 24-291.

नासतो जगतो भावो नदिदृष्टाऽल्लोकादेः । सतः ॥ Hence the theory of 'Sarva Srshti' <sup>61</sup> the creation of even eternal things is refuted in T. S. p. 5. quoted on p. 39-40 f. As Sri Madhva denies creation to eternal things unequivocally, the final teachings of the Sastras is (T. S. T. p. 5):—**सर्वथा स्वरूपस्व-माश्रयस्य तदधीनाविति ॥**—The individuality and essential characters of all the real beings eternal and non-eternal are *dependent upon God*.

But truths become more impressive if they are expressed figuratively. Hence the Vedic seers and mystics who propounded the fact that the reality of eternal things is dependent upon God said figuratively, "God *gives* reality to all things." From this figure emerged the imaginative conception, that the world has no reality of its own, that it has only God-given reality; that God is the only source of all reality. The next stage of the growth of this imaginative idea was the conception that there is no reality outside God, God is the reality, all is Purusha. These three stages of imaginative reflection are expressed also in figurative language; and these expressions *metaphorically* convey the truth that the reality of all things is dependent upon God.

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<sup>61</sup> But Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar quotes:—T. S. T. **पद्मापन्नासनानन्त प्रभृतीदं यदिच्छयासत्तादि लभते ॥** T. S. T. (R):—**मूलोक सृष्टिशब्दार्थमाह सचेति ॥** If he thinks that this passage implies that पद्मा "Lakshmi," etc., also have creation, etc., in the chief sense Mr. H. N. R. is not right. Sri Raghavendra Swamin means that the word 'Satta' means पराधीनविशेष also and that from the point of view of that *unimportant* sense of the word, we may say that everything takes creation at the hands of God (i.e., if creation is interpreted as getting a dependent trait.) The commentaries of S. and S. D., etc., remove all doubts on the point. The passages quoted on p. 3. f. show that according to Sri Raghavendra Swamin himself, the chief meaning of creation is 'coming into existence out of a state of non-existence.'

That the giving of *Ṣvarupa*, *pramiti*, *prāvṛitti* to eternal things is metaphorical becomes manifest to one who reads passages quoted on p. 28 f. 36 f. 44 f. where these truths are told unequivocally in literal expression. The passage in N. S. p. 124 quoted on p. 28 f. explains that Vedic statements apparently teaching that God is the only reality, God is the giver of reality etc., are all figurative expressions of imaginative ways of thinking the truths that God is one without an equal or superior and that he is the maintainer of the reality of eternals and the efficient cause of the reality of non-eternals.

This figurative monism or *Gouna-advaita* of the! Sastras, is mistaken for real monism by Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar. The only justification for Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's book and article is that offered by the poet Milton:—"Bad meals will scarce breed good nourishment in the healthiest concoction: but herein the difference is of bad books, that they do to a discreet and judicious reader serve in many respects to discover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate."—(p. 16. *Areopagitica*.)

As regards nomenclature, Sri Madhva himself has allowed five figurative monistic expressions as appellations explanatory of the nature of the identity taught in a few of the millions of Vedic texts. *All the Vedas are dualistic texts*. Some texts are ambiguous in character. Even they can be construed in a primary dualistic sense. But being ambiguous, they can be interpreted as favouring identity. The identity taught in them, Sri Madhva says, is not non-difference because it is refuted by numberless valid authorities of an unequivocally dualistic character. Therefore the identity conveyed by them is of a secondary character as in the expression, Rama is a lion. Such passages embodying गौणद्वैत are figurative expressions of identity teaching one of five (dualistic) truths. A. V. 2. 3. 14. and 1. 1. 1. point out that there are five varieties of figurative expressions of identity: सादृश्यामेद; स्वातंत्र्यामेद

(not Svatantra-advaita); वैशिष्ट्याभेद (not visishta-abheda); स्थानैक्य and मत्त्वैक्य (in salvation). N. S. p. 451 :—सादृश्यमेवाभेदः सादृश्याभेदः ॥

The identity language employed by the Srutis in those few passages figuratively teach the similarity of the jiva to God; the independence of God; the unequalled glory of God; the one-mindedness of God and the soul in Mukti, or the identity of their abode in Mukti. But this monistic *language* (devoid of the substance, namely monism) signifying *truths opposed to monism* no more secures the identity needed for a monistic doctrine or destroys the dualistic character of the whole system than the expression Rama is a lion proves the identity of or destroys the difference between Rama and the beast.<sup>62</sup> After all they are designed as explanatory names of the character of the contents of a few out of infinite Vedic statements. This figurative usage of monistic expressions, while denying factual identity between the world and God, shows that the two ultimate entities Sri Madhva has accepted *are closely related* and that his dualism is unlike any other discredited dualistic system in the world. Real monism in all its forms is rejected. T. S. T. has a wholesale condemnation of monism:—एकेतु एकमेव तत्त्वमिति मन्यन्ते । तदसत् ॥

<sup>62</sup> Similarity, independence, superiority, one-mindedness and occupation of one space do occasion usages of identity between distinct things: as for example, Rama is a lion; the king won the battle; Arjuna was the only bow-holder of the times; the king and the minister are of one mind; The two armies became one at Egypt. These usages *indicate* also that if two things are to be related they need not be really identical. The sentence 'Rama is a lion' primarily teaches that 'Rama is identical with the lion'; the intended meaning of the figurative expression is 'Rama is *similar* to a lion in courage'; So the identity taught there is not real: it is a usage of identity to express similarity. The other four examples also must be construed in a similar manner.

Sri Madhva's Dvaita repudiates Pantheism and Naturalism and other theories which identify the real world with God. A. V. 3. 2. 10:—अशेषदोषराहित्यं सर्वशक्तिवतो रेः सर्वोपेतैतिकथितमतैक्यं केषिणा ॥ अशेषशक्तियुक्तश्चेत् स्वातन्त्र्यादोषवा- कथम् ॥

It discards Materialism, the theory that everything is form of matter: A. V. 2. 2. 1:—स्वतंत्रवृत्तीरचना साचैवाचेतने कुतः । . . . कुतइच्छाअचेतनस्य सेच्छंचेत्किमचेतनं । . . . इच्छा स्वामित्वमेवोक्तमिच्छावत्त्वं नचापरं ॥

The Idealistic hypothesis that Reality is all consciousness is criticised in T. S. T.:—सर्वं चेतनमेवेति मतनिरासाय मत इत्युक्तं । तच्च अभिमन्यधिकरणे निरस्तं ॥ A. V. 1. 4. 6:—न चेतन-विकारः स्याद्यत्रकापिह्यचेतनं । नाचेतनविकारोपि चेतनःस्यात्कदाचन ॥

The theory that the world is unreal and Brahman or Knowledge is the only reality is disproved in A. V. 2. 2. 8. and 2. 2. 9. One sentence may be quoted:—अनुभूति विरोधेन मिथ्या-त्वे मा न काचन ॥

Sri Madhva denounces the conception of the ultimate unity of the jiva and Brahman, or of the paratantra and Svatantra; A. V. 3. 2. 10:—अखिलमानतः । जीवेशमेददृष्ट्यैव समुदायैकताकुतः ॥ T. V. T.:—सर्वस्य स्वतंत्रत्वे नित्यत्वादि प्रसंगः । अस्वातंत्र्ये नकस्यापि प्रवृत्तिः । अंधपंगुगत्यादि चेति चेन्न । प्रत्यासत्तेरेवानुपपत्तेः ॥

Lastly the conception of identity-and-difference (between the self and the Absolute) which is the pivot of many forms of unvedic monism of the West, is rejected as opposed to experience and all the sources of valid knowledge: A. V. 4. 2.

Introduction says:—नचैव केन हरेः पृथक्त्वमैक्यं तथा स्यादिति श्रुतिमेति । यतो न कुत्रापि भिदामिदा च दृष्टाचितमेतनया कुतश्चित् ॥

Thus as every form of monism is untenable, on pure philosophical considerations, Sri Madhva's Tattva-vada may aptly be named *Qualified Natural Dualism*.<sup>63</sup> The Svatantra is *naturally* different from the asvatantra. The qualification consists in the fact that the two ultimately irreducible principles that are accepted are always *related* by the laws of their inherent natures. Relation, according to Sri Madhva does not imply identity of nature of the things related. On the contrary, as a general rule, relation between two things implies their essential duality of nature. Hence Svatantra and paratantra are essentially distinct principles, because they are *related*; and there is nothing in the conception of relation of Niyamya-niyamaktva (ruled-and-ruler) between them to dilute their essential difference P. D. 8. 3. says:—द्विष्टोयद्यपि सम्बन्धः T. V. mentions the only six contingencies which necessitate the conception of identity-and-difference between two things; मेदपक्यं च . . . । कार्यकारणयोश्चैव तथैव गुणतद्भूतोः । क्रियाक्रियावतोस्तद्वत्तथा जातिविशेषयोः । विशिष्टशुद्धयोश्चैव तथैवांशांशिनोरपि ॥ T. V. T.:—कार्यमुपादेयं । कारणमुपादानम् ॥ The world and Brahman do not belong to any one of these six groups. The Siddhanta, then, ss:—अभिज्ञो भगवान्मैव तद्वन्मेन विभेदवान् ॥ (A. V. 2. 2. 6.) "Brahman is identical with His forms and attributes and is absolutely different from non-God, the entire world."

<sup>63</sup> The word qualified is used figuratively or in the sense of "with special qualifications which entitle it to claim to be the most truthful explanation of life and the most faithful system to the Vēdas."

Sri Madhva repeatedly calls the attention of his readers to the Svatantra-paratantra dvaita. The dualism of God and the world is again and again described as Svatantra-paratantra difference. The reason is obvious. The very word paratantra implies that the world is *naturally* dependent upon God immanent in it and is therefore related to a second being. The word Svatantra implies by its definition the transcendent glory of God.<sup>64</sup> The former—the idea of paratantra, as defined—eschews the defects of unphilosophical dualisms and pluralisms which cannot explain the problems, of variety, free-will, world-order, harmony and uniformity of nature; the latter—the idea of Svatantra as defined—emphasises the absolute and ultimate distinctness of the two elements postulated, prevents the system from degenerating into the barren simplicity of all forms of monism<sup>65</sup> and idealism and safeguards the dualistic character of the system. The system is thus Natural Dualism, the dualism of two ultimately distinct but ever related beings; dualism with a *qualification* not possessed by any other system in the world, for the difference and the relation are both natural and mutually unopposed in character.

## **CONCLUSION**

Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar's article is a manual of Theism. The quotations he has given are all dualistic in significance. But by misusing them and misinterpreting them at times, and sometimes by using them in wrong contexts and by wrongly defining the terms monism, theism, etc., he

<sup>64</sup> T. S. T. p. 2 :—स्वरूप प्रमिति प्रवृत्ति लक्षणसत्ता त्रैविध्ये परानपेक्षं स्वतन्त्रं । परापेक्षमस्वतन्त्रम् ॥

<sup>65</sup> A. V. 1. 1. 1; 3. 2. 1. etc., show the force of logic with which Sri Madhva repudiates monism in all its forms; and how earnestly he thinks that monistic lendings are a degradation, not an exaltation to a philosophical system which aims to be a true explanation of life and universe.

mystifies his readers into a belief that there is no second cause at all in the system of Sri Madhva, as if a dependent cause has no distinct individuality. The philosophy which maintains that God is responsible for everything, is Theism; that which holds that God is everything is monism. In Christianity we have a theistic conception of God who actually creates a world with no material cause; the world according to the Bible is actually derived from God. Still substantial difference is admitted between the world and God, and so the system is called a form of Theism and not monism except in a very loose sense. There is no example of a monistic system in the world which maintains two reals devoid of factual identity in some form or other, in other words which accepts absolute distinctness between the two reals postulated.

Dvaita, on the other hand, accepts many eternal coevals with inherent reality of their own distinct from God and the fact that they are all dependent upon the God immanent in them does not take away their distinct individualities and entitle us to regard them as constituent elements of a monistic scheme of thought. Mr. H. N. Raghavendrachar ignores this aspect of Sri Madhva's teachings. The existence of a Svatantra is a gift of the Vedas. From the idea of Svatantrya with which Mr. H. N. R. begins his thesis, the Gunapurnatva (perfection) of God, is to be inferred. On the other hand, Sri Madhva's philosophy starts with the idea of perfection and accepts the quality of independence as a proof of the admitted perfection.<sup>66</sup> The philosophy of a perfect God is Theism. There is no need to feel ashamed of being a Theist. No nation can be without God for long, for all nations are rooted in Him. Theism will be the ruling philosophy of the world including Russia; for it is Truth.

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<sup>66</sup> See V. T. V. p. 1:—सर्वोत्कर्षे देवदेवस्य विष्णोः महातात्पर्यं नैवचान्यत्रसत्यं । and N. S. 312:—ईश्वरः सकलगुणपूर्णः सर्वदोष-दूरश्च स्वतन्त्रत्वात् ॥



## ABBREVIATIONS

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<b>A V</b> —Ānuyakhyana.	<b>P C</b> —Pramana Candrika.
<b>Ai Bh</b> —Āitareya Bhashya.	<b>P D</b> —Prameya Dipika.
<b>Ai Bh T</b> —Āitareya Bhashya Tika.	<b>S</b> —Srinivasa Tirthiya.
<b>B S</b> —Brahma Sutras.	<b>S D</b> —Satyadharma.
<b>B S B</b> —Brahma Sutra Bhashya.	<b>S T R M</b> —Sattattva Ratna- mala.
<b>B. S. B. D.</b> —Brahma Sutra Bhashya Dipika.	<b>T C</b> —Tatparya Candrika,
<b>Bhg.</b> —Bhagavata.	<b>T P</b> —Tattva Prakasika.
<b>Bhg. T.</b> —Bhagavata Tatparya	<b>T S</b> —Tattve Sankhyana.
<b>Br Bh</b> —Brhadarana Bhasya.	<b>T S T</b> —Tattva Sankhyana Tika.
<b>D P P V</b> —Dvaita Philosophy and its place in the Veda- nta.	<b>T S T (R)</b> —Tattva Sankhyana Tika Raghavendra Tirthiya
<b>D P Psy</b> —Dictionary of Philo- sophy and Psychology.	<b>T S T (S)</b> —Tattva Sankhyana Tika Srinivasa Tirthiya.
(Wrongly printed as D P S).	<b>T V</b> —Tattva Viveka.
<b>D S</b> —Dvadasa Stotra.	<b>T V T</b> —Tattva Viveka Tika.
<b>En R E</b> —Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.	<b>Tai Up</b> —Taittareya Upanishad.
<b>Gita Bh</b> —Gita Bhasya.	<b>Tai Bh</b> —Taittareya Bhashya.
<b>G V</b> —Gita Vivritti.	<b>Tai Bh T</b> —Taittareya Bhashya Tika.
<b>M S S</b> —Madhva Siddhanta Sara.	<b>Tai Bh T (S)</b> —Taittareya Bha- shya Tika Srinivasa Tir- thiya.
<b>M T N</b> —Mahabharata Tatparya Nirnaya.	<b>U K M</b> —Upadhyakhandana Man- daramanjari.
<b>M V</b> —Madhva Vijaya.	<b>V T N or V T V</b> —Vishnu Ta- ttva-Vinirnaya.
<b>N S</b> —Nyaya Sudha.	<b>V T V T</b> — " " Tika
<b>N V</b> —Nyaya Vivarana.	<b>V T V T (B)</b> — " " "
<b>N V B</b> —Nyaya Vivarana Bha- vabodha.	(Bhavadipa).
<b>O E D</b> —Oxford English Dic- tionary.	<b>Y M</b> —Yukti Mallika.
	<b>छ भा</b> —Chandogya Bhashya.

## Extract of a few opinions on Dvaitapradipa and Tattva Sikshe

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1. ... The work by Prof. D. Vasudevacharya...is a highly scholarly defence of Dvaita Vedanta particularly, as well as other systems.....Such eminent authorities.....have pointed out that Mr. H. N. Raghavendracharya has misunderstood not only Sri Madhva but also Sri Ramanuja and Sri Sankara.... I entirely agree with Prof. Vasudevacharya in the view that Mr. Raghavendracharya *should not misrepresent* any of the great acharyas. In view of these facts every impartial reader will find it a source of great delight and profit to go through Prof. Sriman Vasudevacharya's highly authoritative and scholarly work.

V. SUBRMANYA IYER,

*Retired Registrar of the University of Mysore*

2. श्रीमन्तो राघवेन्द्राचार्याः—ब्रह्माद्वैतवादं प्रपञ्चसत्यतावादश्च मतत्रयसाधरणमेकरूपमित्युपनिषत्प्रतिपाद्यं मन्यन्ते । तेषां स्वतन्त्र-बुद्धीनां मतमपि स्वतन्त्रम् । द्वैतविशिष्टद्वैताद्वैतसम्प्रदाय निबन्धानां सर्वेषां न केवलं विरुद्धं किन्तु अनौपनिषदिकमपि । अत्र प्रबन्धे (Dvaita philosophy and its place in the Vedanta) . . . विरोधा-बहवोवर्तन्त इति . . . द्वैतप्रदीपे विवोचेतमेव ॥

Mahamahopadhyaya ANANTAKRISHNA SASTRI.

*University of Calcutta.*

3. ... Pandit D. Vasudevacharya has argued in simple, striking and straightforward Kannada that the description of Sri Madhva as a 'monist' and of Dvaita Vedanta as 'monism' given by Prof. H. N. Raghavendracharya...is totally untenable

in the light of the internal evidence afforded by the works of Sri Madhva and those of his Commentators.....The author has singled out about twenty five contexts from the work of Mr. H. N. Raghavendracharya and refuted them in detail citing throughout textual testimony from the original Sanskrit sources.....Vidvan Vasudevacharya is to be congratulated on his vigorous and virile vindication of Sri Madhva's system.

The Hindu, 31—10—43.

Dr. R. NAGARAJA SARMA.

4. ... I am glad to say that you have successfully challenged the position of Dr. H. N. Raghavendracharya who, I believe, has done greatest disservice to the cause of Dvaita Philosophy. You deserve to be congratulated on the prompt reply you have issued to Dr. H. N. Raghavendracharya to his unsystematic and confusing treatises of philosophy.

(Sd.) Dr. R. S. PANCHAMUKHI,

*Director of Kannada research,*

*Dharwar.*

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## **Dvaita Pradipa and Tattva Sikshe**

BY

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**Re, 1—8—0.**

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